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PREINDICTMENT PROSECUTORIAL
CONDUCT IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
REVISITED'
JUDGE JAMES F. HOLDERMAN' &
CHARLES B. REDFERN3
INTRODUCTION BY JUDGE HOLDERMAN
In 1980, the Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology published an
article I authored entitled "Preindictment Prosecutorial Conduct in the
Federal System."4 That 1980 article was cited thereafter by various federal
and state courts in published judicial opinions5 and was chosen for
republication in the National Law Review Reporter.
6
At the time I wrote The 1980 Article, I had personally dealt with many
of the preindictment issues which I discussed because I had previously
supervised lengthy grand jury investigations into corruption by high-
I The authors gratefully acknowledge and thank Jessica R. Mullan and Jonathan Van
Loo, Northwestern University School of Law Class of 2007; Charlie M. Evans, Law Clerk to
the Honorable James F. Holderman, 2003-2005; Halley B. Guren, Law Clerk to the
Honorable James F. Holderman, 2005-2007; and the Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology editorial board for their invaluable assistance on this article. Of course, any
errors or omissions are the sole responsibility of the authors.
2 United States District Judge, Northern District of Illinois, 1985 to present. University
of Illinois, B.S. 1968; University of Illinois, College of Law, J.D. 1971.
3 Law Clerk to the Honorable James F. Holderman, 2004-2006. American University,
B.S. and B.A. 1999; University of Illinois, College of Law, J.D. 2004.
4 James F. Holderman, Preindictment Prosecutorial Conduct in the Federal System, 71 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY I (1980) [hereinafter The 1980,Article].
5 See, e.g., Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 501 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1983); United States v. Smith,
687 F.2d 147, 152 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Santucci, 674 F.2d 624, 627-28 (7th Cir.
1982); United States v. Udziela, 671 F.2d 995, 998 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Santucci, 504 F. Supp. 1072, 1075 (N.D. 111. 1980); Schwartz v. Dep't of Justice, 494 F.
Supp. 1268, 1274 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Gershon v. Broomfield, 642 P.2d 852, 857 (Ariz. 1982)
(en banc).
6 James F. Holderman, Preindictment Prosecutorial Conduct in the Federal System, 1
NAT'L L. REv. REP. 1375 (1980) (reprinting The 1980 Article).
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ranking public officials as the head of the Public Corruption Section of the
United States Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Illinois in
Chicago.7 I also personally prosecuted a variety of public corruption cases
8
while in the United States Attorney's Office. After that, I became a partner
with the law firm of Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal where I specialized in
federal court litigation and dealt with issues in both criminal 9 and civil
cases. 10 Now having spent the last twenty years on the federal district
bench in Chicago presiding over hundreds of cases, I have come to the
conclusion that although a lot has happened in federal criminal law over the
last quarter century, the introductory premise of The 1980 Article remains
true today:
The potential and capacity for prosecutorial abuse is heightened at the preindictment
stage of the federal criminal process, which historically has been carried on largely in
secret. A defendant's rights may be irreparably prejudiced at this phase of the
criminal process without the defendant, his lawyer, or the court ever finding out. It is,
therefore, necessary for federal prosecutors at the preindictment stage to be
particularly scrupulous in their conduct.II
Consequently, at the urging of my co-author and senior law clerk,
Charles Redfern, we have attempted in this article to revisit the topic of
preindictment prosecutorial conduct in the federal system to discuss the law
as it exists today with emphasis on the changes that have occurred since
1980. This Article, therefore, follows the general outline of The 1980
Article, and with pertinent historical deference, sets forth the law as it now
exists. It is our hope that all counsel who work in the federal system will
find our discussions useful as they proceed at the preindictment stage of the
criminal process.
7 See, e.g., In re Special April 1977 Grand Jury, 587 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1978) (grand jury
investigation of Illinois Attorney General).
8 See, e.g., United States v. McNary, 620 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1980) (mayor of Lansing,
Illinois); United States v. Craig, 573 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1977) (elected Illinois state
legislators); United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1974) (police officers in
Chicago).
9 See, e.g., United States v. Boykin, 688 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Peller,
685 F.2d 434 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Gregory, 656 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Smith, 633 F.2d 739 (7th Cir. 1980).
10 See, e.g., In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 609 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1979); In re
Shopping Cart Antitrust Litig., 95 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Elec. Weld Steel
Tubing Antitrust Litig., 512 F. Supp. 81 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Bartinikas v. Clarklift of Chi. N.,
508 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
1 The 1980 Article, supra note 4, at 1.
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I. IMPACT OF PUBLISHED STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTORIAL CONDUCT
Government attorneys acting in a preindictment setting can now look
to a greater variety of sources for guidance as to what is proper
prosecutorial conduct than they could in 1980. Federal statutes,
Department of Justice policy statements, state laws, and local court rules are
applicable to such conduct and provide ethical guidelines.
At the time of The 1980 Article, no federal statute existed dealing with
prosecutorial conduct. However, Congress in the late 1990s enacted laws to
address legislative concern on the subject. 12 The first enactment occurred in
1997 when Congress authorized the awarding of reasonable attorney's fees
and other litigation expenses to a prevailing criminal defendant when a
federal district court found that the position of the United States in the
criminal litigation was "vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith," unless the
court found that special circumstances made the award unjust.' 3  The
legislation has been interpreted as an effort by Congress to address
prosecutorial misconduct, not to curb zealous, yet appropriate,
prosecutions. 14 The circuits currently disagree over the question of the level
of prosecutorial impropriety required under the statute for the awarding of
12 See United States v. Gilbert, 198 F.3d 1293, 1299 (1 1th Cir. 1999); Elkan Abramowitz
& Peter Scher, The Hyde Amendment: Congress Creates a Toehold for Curbing Wrongful
Prosecutions, CHAMPION, Mar. 1998, at 22, 23.
13 Department of Justice Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, tit. IV, § 617,
111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (1997), reported in the Historical and Statutory Notes to 18 U.S.C. §
3006A (2006), states:
During fiscal year 1998 and in any fiscal year thereafter, the court, in any criminal case (other
than a case in which the defendant is represented by assigned counsel paid for by the public)
pending on or after the date of the enactment of this Act [Nov. 26, 1997], may award to a
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation
expenses, where the court finds that the position of the United States was vexatious, frivolous, or
in bad faith, unless the court finds that special circumstances make such an award unjust. Such
awards shall be granted pursuant to the procedures and limitations (but not the burden of proof)
provided for an award under 28 U.S.C. § 2412. To determine whether or not to award fees and
costs under this section, the court, for good cause shown, may receive evidence ex parte and in
camera (which shall include the submission of classified evidence or evidence that reveals or
might reveal the identity of an informant or undercover agent or matters occurring before a grand
jury) and evidence or testimony so received shall be kept under seal. Fees and other expenses
awarded under this provision to a party shall be paid by the agency over which the party prevails
from any funds made available to the agency by appropriation. No new appropriations shall be
made as a result of this provision.
This legislation is commonly referred to as the "Hyde Amendment," after Illinois
Republican Congressman Henry Hyde, who chaired the House Judiciary Committee at the
time of the legislation's passage. See Gilbert, 198 F.3d at 1299-1303 (providing extensive
discussion of the Hyde Amendment's legislative history).
14 See, e.g., Gilbert, 198 F.3d at 1304 (noting that the act is to "sanction and deter
prosecutorial misconduct, not prosecutorial zealousness per se").
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attorney's fees and costs to the aggrieved defendant. 15 Future litigation of
the issue, with perhaps an ultimate determination by the Supreme Court of
the United States, may be necessary to resolve the conflict among the
circuits.
The other congressional action of the late 1990's addressing federal
prosecutorial conduct occurred in 1998 when Congress mandated, in
legislation entitled "Ethical Standards for Attorneys for the Government,"
28 U.S.C. § 530B, that federal government attorneys, including federal
prosecutors, be subject to local state laws and ethical requirements as well
as to local federal court rules.16  Before Congress enacted § 530B, the
15 See United States v. Carlson, No. Crim. A. 04-370-09, 2005 WL 2989671, at *2-5
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 2005) (Baylson, J.) (citing United States v. Schneider, 395 F.3d 78, 86-88
(2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Heavrin, 330 F.3d 723, 730 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Manchester Farming P'ship, 315 F.3d 1176, 1181 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Knott,
256 F.3d 20, 29 (1st Cir. 2001); Gilbert, 198 F.3d at 1299). Judge Baylson noted (1) a
disagreement between the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits over the question of whether a party
seeking attorney's fees and costs must demonstrate all three elements of vexatious, frivolous
and bad faith or whether demonstrating one of three was sufficient to satisfy the statute, id. at
*2, (2) a disagreement over the meaning of vexatious under the statute with the Fourth, Sixth
and Eleventh Circuits applying an "ordinary meaning" definition to "vexatious suit" as being
"instituted maliciously and without good cause," while the First and Ninth Circuits "held that
a finding of "vexatious" under the Hyde Amendment "requires both a showing that the
criminal case was objectively deficient, in that it lacked either legal merit or factual
foundation, and a showing that the government's conduct, when viewed objectively,
manifests maliciousness or an intent to harass and annoy," id. at *4 (citations omitted), and
(3) a disagreement over the meaning of frivolous, with the Sixth Circuit defining frivolous as
"lacking a reasonable legal basis or where the government lacks a reasonable expectation of
attaining sufficient material evidence by the time of trial," while the Eleventh Circuit's
definition is "one that is groundless ...with little prospect of success; often brought to
embarrass or annoy the defendant," id. at *5.
28 U.S.C. § 1927, a comparable statute used in civil cases, allows for the sanctioning
of an attorney who unreasonable or vexatiously multiplies a proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 1927
(2000). Although § 1927 is applied in civil litigation, while the Hyde Amendment is applied
in criminal proceedings, the circuits are also currently split over the question of the mental
state needed to find an attorney culpable for violating § 1927. See James F. Holderman,
Section 1927 Sanctions and the Split Among the Circuits, 32 LITIG. 44 (Fall 2005).
16 28 U.S.C. § 530B, passed by Congress as part of the Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998), states that:
(a) An attorney for the Government shall be subject to State laws and rules, and local Federal
court rules, governing attorneys in each State where such attorney engages in that attorney's
duties, to the same extent and in the same manner as other attorneys in that State.
(b) The Attorney General shall make and amend rules of the Department of Justice to assure
compliance with this section.
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Department of Justice argued that federal prosecutors were exempt from the
requirements of state bar and local court ethics rules under both the
Supremacy Clause and separation of powers. 
17
Federal courts, in construing 28 U.S.C. § 530B, have rejected attempts
to have that law impose ethical obligations on federal prosecutors that are
inconsistent with federal law.' 8 This judicial interpretation is based on the
view that Congress was not delegating to the states or local courts authority
to make rules that would expand a prosecutor's ethical obligations in the
federal courts.' 9  Instead, § 530B has been recognized as a general
declaration from Congress that federal government prosecutors must follow
the ethical requirements applicable to all attorneys practicing law.20 The
Department of Justice has also issued official guidance in the Code of
Federal Regulations on how Department attorneys should implement 28
U.S.C. § 530B.2 '
(c) As used in this section, the term "attorney for the Government" includes any attorney
described in section 77.2(a) of part 77 of Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations and also
includes any independent counsel, or employee of such a counsel, appointed under chapter 40.
The statute has been referred to as both the "Citizens Protection Act" and the "McDade
Amendment." See N.Y. State Bar Ass'n v. F.T.C., 276 F. Supp. 2d 110, 131 (D.D.C. 2003);
United States v. Straub, No. 5:99-10, 1999 WL 33495606, at * 2 (N.D. W. Va. June 14,
1999).
17 See N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 131-33.
18 See Stern v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Mass., 214 F.3d 4, 19 (1st Cir. 2000)
("[It simply cannot be said that Congress, by enacting section 530B, meant to empower
states (or federal district courts, for that matter) to regulate government attorneys in a
manner inconsistent with federal law."); United States v. Condon, 170 F.3d 687, 690 (7th
Cir. 1999) (holding that § 530B involves rules of conduct, not rules of evidence); United
States v. Lowery, 166 F.3d 1119, 1125 (lth Cir. 1999) (holding that § 530B is not a
delegation by Congress to the states to create professional rules that would regulate what
evidence should be admitted in federal court).
19 Lowery, 166 F.3d at 1125; cf United States v. Plumley, 207 F.3d 1086, 1095 (8th Cir.
2000) (citations omitted) ("The interpretation of state disciplinary rules as they apply to
federal criminal law practice should be and is a matter of federal law.").
20 See Judicial Administration, 28 C.F.R. § 77.1(c) (2005) ("Section 530B imposes on
Department attorneys the same rules of professional responsibility that apply to non-
Department attorneys, but should not be construed to impose greater burdens on Department
attorneys than those on non-Department attorneys or to alter rules of professional
responsibility that expressly exempt government attorneys from their application.").
21 28 C.F.R. § 77.4 states:
Section 77.4 Guidance.
(a) Rules of the court before which a case is pending. A government attorney shall, in all cases,
comply with the rules of ethical conduct of the court before which a particular case is pending.
(b) Inconsistent rules where there is a pending case.
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The central source of internal guidance for federal prosecutors is the
same now as it was in 1980, the United States Attorneys' Manual
("Manual"). 22 The Manual is a primary source of policies and procedures
for the United States Attorneys' offices.23 Throughout this Article,
reference will be made to applicable sections of the Manual because federal
prosecutors are to follow its guidance in carrying out all phases of their
official responsibilities, including during the preindictment phase of a
federal criminal investigation. The Manual, however, only provides
(1) If the rule of the attorney's state of licensure would prohibit an action that is permissible
under the rules of the court before which a case is pending, the attorney should consider:
(i) Whether the attorney's state of licensure would apply the rule of the court before
which the case is pending, rather than the rule of the state of licensurc;
(ii) Whether the local federal court rule preempts contrary state rules; and
(iii) Whether application of traditional choice-of-law principles directs the attorney to
comply with a particular rule.
(2) In the process of considering the factors described in paragraph (b)(I) of this section, the
attorney is encouraged to consult with a supervisor or Professional Responsibility Officer to
determine the best course of conduct.
(c) Choice of rules where there is no pending case.
(1) Where no case is pending, the attorney should generally comply with the ethical rules of
the attorney's state of licensure, unless application of traditional choice-of-law principles
directs the attorney to comply with the ethical rule of another jurisdiction or court, such as
the ethical rule adopted by the court in which the case is likely to be brought.
(2) In the process of considering the factors described in paragraph (c)(1) of this section, the
attorney is encouraged to consult with a supervisor or Professional Responsibility Officer to
determine the best course of conduct.
(d) Rules that impose an irreconcilable conflict. If, after consideration of traditional choice-of-
law principles, the attorney concludes that multiple rules may apply to particular conduct and
that such rules impose irreconcilable obligations on the attorney, the attorney should consult with
a supervisor or Professional Responsibility Officer to determine the best course of conduct.
(e) Supervising attorneys. Each attorney, including supervisory attorneys, must assess his or her
ethical obligations with respect to particular conduct. Department attorneys shall not direct any
attorney to engage in conduct that violates section 530B. A supervisor or other Department
attorney who, in good faith, gives advice or guidance to another Department attorney about the
other attorney's ethical obligations should not be deemed to violate these rules.
() Investigative Agents. A Department attorney shall not direct an investigative agent acting
under the attorney's supervision to engage in conduct under circumstances that would violate the
attorney's obligations under section 530B. A Department attorney who in good faith provides
legal advice or guidance upon request to an investigative agent should not be deemed to violate
these rules.
22 U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL (2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/
foia readingroom/usam (last visited March 5, 2006). Federal prosecutions are also carried
out by other components of the Department of Justice such as the Criminal, Tax and
Antitrust Divisions.
23 Id. tit. 1, § 1.100.
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internal Department of Justice guidance and does create any rights that a
party can rely upon in either a civil or criminal proceeding.2 4 Federal courts
have uniformly applied the Manual's statement in holding that the Manual
does not create enforceable rights for criminal defendants.25
Federal prosecutors may also look beyond the federal statutes and
Department of Justice policy statements to secondary ethical sources with
regard to their pre-indictment conduct, most notably the American Bar
Association's Criminal Justice Section Prosecution Function Standards.26
Although federal prosecutors are not required to adhere to the ABA
Prosecution Standards, the Manual recommends that federal prosecutors be
familiar with these standards since courts have referred to them when
evaluating prosecutorial conduct.
27
II. THE DECISION TO INVESTIGATE AND EMPLOY THE GRAND JURY
The decision to investigate and prosecute a suspected crime is
inherently the province of the executive branch.28  Although the Attorney
24 Id.; cf 28 C.F.R. § 77.5 (noting that the regulations interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 530B are
solely for the guidance of government attorneys and do not create rights or benefits for
others).
25 United States v. Wilson, 413 F.3d 382, 389 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing United States v.
Gomez, 237 F.3d 238, 241 n.1 (3d Cir. 2000); United States v. Fernandez, 231 F.3d 1240,
1246 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Blackley, 167 F.3d 543, 548-49 (D.C. Cir. 1999);
United States v. Myers, 123 F.3d 350, 356 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Piervinanzi, 23
F.3d 670, 682 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Craveiro, 907 F.2d 260, 264 (1st Cir. 1990)
("Thus, although we do not endorse the Department's failure to follow its own policies...
we are constrained to conclude that any such failure that may have occurred here
nevertheless does not mandate (or even allow) relief for the [defendant].")); cf United States
v. Lee, 274 F.3d 485, 493 (8th Cir. 2001) (failure to follow DOJ death penalty protocol does
not create individual rights that the defendant can enforce and therefore the district court
cannot order a new death penalty hearing on that basis).
26 AM. BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-3.5 (1993) [hereinafter STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE].
27 U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 22, tit. 9, § 2.101 ("The American Bar
Association Standards for Criminal Justice have not been adopted as official policy by the
Department; however, since the courts utilize the Standards in determining issues covered by
them, it is recommended that all United States Attorneys familiarize themselves with
them."); see, e.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972) (applying ABA
standards in evaluating prosecutorial conduct); United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252,
1266 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Morris, 988 F.2d 1335, 1340 (4th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Martino, 825 F.2d 754, 759 (3d Cir. 1987).
28 See In re United States, 345 F.3d 450, 453 (7th Cir. 2003) ("The Constitution's 'Take
Care' clause (art. II., § 3) places the power to prosecute in the executive branch.");
The decision to indict, allege specific charges or dismiss charges is inherently an exercise of
executive power, and the prosecutor has broad discretion in these matters. The executive can
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General of the United States is the head of the Department of Justice of the
United States, the United States Attorneys of the federal judicial districts
throughout the country are the chief federal law enforcement officers of the
United States within their particular jurisdiction, 29 and serve as the nation's
principal federal litigators under the direction of the Attorney General.30
Congress has statutorily directed the United States Attorneys to prosecute
all offenses against the United States that occur in their districts.31
United States Attorneys and the federal prosecutors who work with
them enjoy broad discretion in exercising their authority to decide whether
to investigate and prosecute with very limited judicial review in this area.32
choose not to prosecute one case, yet prosecute vigorously another involving the same issues.
The judiciary cannot compel prosecutions.
United States v. Martin, 287 F.3d 609, 623 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Newman v. United States,
382 F.2d 479, 480-82 (D.C. Cir. 1967)) (citations omitted); WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL.,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 13.2(a) (1999) ("There is no question that prosecutors in this
country have long exercised this discretionary authority.").
29 U.S. ATTORNEYS MISSION STATEMENT (2005), available at www.usdoj.gov/usao/. The
United States Attorneys' offices also interact with other parts of the Department of Justice
and other federal government agencies. The United States Attorneys are authorized to
request the appropriate federal investigative agency to investigate alleged or suspected
violations of federal law. U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 22, tit. 9, § 2.010. There
are also certain notification and pre-approval requirements imposed on the United States
Attorneys' Offices in conjunction with their relationship with the Department of Justice,
Criminal Division and Office of the Solicitor General. See id. tit. 9, §§ 1.000, 2.000.
30 U.S. ATTORNEYS MISSION STATEMENT, supra note 29. "United States Attorneys are
appointed by, and serve at the discretion of, the President of the United States, with advice
and consent of the United States Senate," Id. There are ninety-three United States
Attorneys, with one assigned to each judicial district, with the exceptions of Guam and the
Northern Mariana Islands, where one United States Attorney serves both districts. Id.
31 28 U.S.C. § 547(1) (2000).
The United States Attorney, within his/her district, has plenary authority with regard to federal
criminal matters. This authority is exercised under the supervision and direction of the Attorney
General and his/her delegates. The statutory duty to prosecute for all offenses against the United
States (28 U.S.C. § 547) carries with it the authority necessary to perform this duty. The United
States Attorney is invested by statute and delegation from the Attorney General with the broadest
discretion in the exercise of such authority. The authority, discretionary power, and
responsibility of the United States Attorney with relation to criminal matters encompass... : (A)
investigation suspected or alleged offenses against the United States. . . . ; (B) causing
investigations to be conducted by the appropriate federal law enforcement agencies .. ; (C)
declining prosecutions... ; (D) authorizing prosecutions, . . . ; (E) determining the manner of
prosecutions and deciding trial related questions,.. (F) recommending whether to appeal or
not to appeal from an adverse ruling or decision.
U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 22, tit. 9, § 2.001.
32 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (citing Wayte v. United
States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)); United States v. Romero, 360 F.3d 1248, 1252 (10th Cir.
2004); United States v. Martin, 287 F.3d 609, 623 (7th Cir. 2002) ("The judiciary cannot
compel prosecutions."); United States v. Goodson, 204 F.3d 508, 512-13 (4th Cir. 2000)
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The Manual does not contain specific policy guidance on when to initiate a
criminal investigation but standards have been articulated by the ABA.33
Some legal scholars have suggested that because grand jury investigations
are more time consuming, expensive, and logistically cumbersome than
traditional police investigations, prosecutors traditionally use grand jury
investigations only when the special setting of the grand jury provides a
distinct advantage over traditional police investigations.34
(reversing district court order that precluded prosecutor from dismissing an indictment on the
basis that it was "in the public interest"); Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(dismissing mandamus action to compel Attorney General to prosecute violation of Federal
Corrupt Practices Act); Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 376
(2d Cir. 1973) (dismissing class action to compel investigation of state officials'
management of correctional facility; held to be solely within prosecutorial discretion);
Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480-82 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
33 Standard 3-3.1 Investigative Function of Prosecutor:
(a) A prosecutor ordinarily relies on police and other investigative agencies for investigation of
alleged criminal acts, but the prosecutor has an affirmative responsibility to investigate suspected
illegal activity when it is not adequately dealt with by other agencies.
(b) A prosecutor should not invidiously discriminate against or in favor of any person on the
basis of race, religion, sex, sexual preference, or ethnicity in exercising discretion to investigate
or to prosecute. A prosecutor should not use other improper considerations in exercising such
discretion.
(c) A prosecutor should not knowingly use illegal means to obtain evidence or to employ or
instruct or encourage others to use such means.
(d) A prosecutor should not discourage or obstruct communication between prospective
witnesses and defense counsel. A prosecutor should not advise any person or cause any person
to be advised to decline to give to the defense information which such person has the right to
give.
(e) A prosecutor should not secure the attendance of persons for interviews by use of any
communication which has the appearance or color of a subpoena or similar judicial process
unless the prosecutor is authorized by law to do so.
(f) A prosecutor should not promise not to prosecute for prospective criminal activity, except
where such activity is part of an officially supervised investigative and enforcement program.
(g) Unless a prosecutor is prepared to forgo impeachment of a witness by the prosecutor's own
testimony as to what the witness stated in an interview or to seek leave to withdraw from the case
in order to present the impeaching testimony, a prosecutor should avoid interviewing a
prospective witness except in the presence of a third person.
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 26, § 3-3.1 (1993).
34 See LAFAVE, supra note 28, § 8.3 (noting that the advantages of the grand jury include
(1) witnesses can be compelled to cooperate with the grand jury through subpoenas,
contempt power and the elimination of Fifth Amendment privilege through immunization,
(2) voluminous business records can be obtained through a grand jury subpoena allowing for
the creation of a complex "paper trail" when those same documents would most likely be
unavailable to the police when probably cause is not available to search the location were the
536 JAMES F. HOLDERMAN & CHARLES B. REDFERN [Vol. 96
III. THE USE OF GRAND JURY INVESTIGATORY POWER
As was the law in 1980, the district court of the judicial district in
which the grand jury sits will summon grand juries when required by the
public's interest.3 5 A grand jury must have at least sixteen jurors for a
quorum and the number cannot exceed twenty-three.36 A grand jury can be
summoned to sit as members of either a "regular" or "special" grand jury.3 7
The Fifth Amendment establishes the need and existence of the grand
jury in the federal system.38 Although the grand jury interacts with both the
prosecutor and the courts, federal courts have recognized that the grand jury
is not assigned to any of the three branches of government but is instead a
constitutional fixture in its own right.39  The grand jury in a particular
federal district is responsible for investigating possible criminal violations
documents are located, and (3) the ability to keep sensitive investigations secret through the
grand jury's secrecy requirement).
35 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(a)(1); see United States v. Salgado, 250 F.3d 438, 454 (6th Cir.
2001) ("[I]t is the district court which has the authority under Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure to summon the grand jury to which government's evidence must be
presented in order to secure an indictment."); United States v. Deffenbaugh Indus., Inc., 957
F.2d 749, 753 (10th Cir. 1992).
36 18 U.S.C. § 3321 (2000); FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(a)(l). The use of alternate jurors is also
allowed. Id. at 6(a)(2). "The usual practice in some districts is to call four to six
alternatives, who are sworn and instructed with the regular members. These alternates are
then excused with the explanation that they will be subject to call, the order in which they
were selected, if it subsequently becomes necessary to excuse one of the regular members
and replace that person with an alternate (to facilitate the assemblage of a quorum during the
remaining life of the grand jury)." FED. JUDICIAL CTR., BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT
COURT JUDGES § 7.04 (March 2000 ed.).
37 Although special grand juries consist of the same number of members as a regular
grand jury, special grand juries sit for a longer period of time and for a different purpose than
a regular grand jury. SUSAN W. BRENNER & GREGORY G. LOCKHART, FEDERAL GRAND JURY
PRACTICE § 2.4 (2005). Special grand juries conduct investigations while regular grand
juries traditionally consider whether the evidence supports the prosecution's requested
charges. Id. Special grand juries are limited to sitting in judicial districts containing more
than four million people or when the Attorney General or another authorized Department of
Justice official states in writing to the chief judge of the district that a special grand jury is
needed because of the criminal activity in the district. 18 U.S.C. § 3331. Regular grand
juries sit for up to eighteen months with a permissible six-month extension creating a total
possible term of twenty-four months. FED. R. CRIM P. 6(g). Special grand juries sit for an
initial term of eighteen months and can be extended on an incremental basis to sit for up to
thirty-six months. 18 U.S.C. § 3331.
38 U.S. CONST. amend. V. ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger.").
39 See, e.g., United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1196 (9th Cir. 2005) (en
banc) (citing United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992)).
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of federal laws and returning indictments after finding probable cause to
believe that a crime has been committed.40 The grand jury's investigatory
power is tremendously broad.4' Grand juries have jurisdiction to
investigate conduct merely because that conduct might have been a federal
42
crime within the jurisdiction of the federal court convening the grand jury.
Both the prosecutor and the grand jury serve dual roles in the process.
Grand juries, while responsible for determining if probable cause exists that
a crime has been committed and returning indictments in accordance with
those findings, must also act to protect against unfounded criminal
prosecutions.4 3 The prosecutor must seek indictments when warranted and
must also be an advisor to the grand jury.44 A prosecutor's use of the grand
jury's power is limited only by the grand jury's obligation to evaluate
evidence to determine whether to return an indictment.45 It is not an abuse
of the grand jury process if, in addition to conducting investigation, a
prosecutor seeks to obtain evidence of additional criminal conduct or seeks
to "lock in" witnesses' testimony under oath for further investigation of
wrongdoing.46 As in 1980, a federal prosecutor cannot use the grand jury
for the sole or dominant purpose47 of: (1) obtaining additional evidence on
40 ANTITRUST Div., DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GRAND JURY MANUAL I-1 (1991), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/206542.pdf (hereinafter ANTITRUST DIVISION].
41 See United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991) (quoting United States
v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950)). "The tremendous breadth of the grand
jury's investigatory powers is underscored by the [Supreme] Court's often quoted comment
that 'such an investigation may [be] triggered by tips, rumors, evidence proffered by the
prosecutor, or the personal knowledge of the grand jurors."' In re Grand Jury Matter, 770
F.2d 36, 40 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 701 (1972)); see,
e.g., United States v. York, 428 F.3d 1325, 1331-32 (1 1th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 344 (1974)).
42 United States v. Brown, 49 F.3d 1162, 1168 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v.
Mclnnis, 601 F.2d 1319, 1327 (5th Cir. 1979)); see, e.g., United States v. Paxson, 861 F.2d
730, 733 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
43 Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d at 1196 (citing Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 686-87).
44 Williams, 504 U.S. at 63 (citing United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567, 573-74 (L.
Hand, J., dissenting)).
45 U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 22, tit. 9, § 11.120 (citing Costello v. United
States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956)); cf United States v. Suleiman, 208 F.3d 32, 40 (2d Cir.
2000) (citations omitted):
The grand jury's investigation of a criminal conspiracy does not cease where, as here, the
government has already convicted some persons for participating in that conspiracy. The grand
jury can still call witnesses to achieve a "complete" investigation where its inquiry "is directed at
persons suspected of no misconduct but who may be able to provide links in a chain of evidence
relating to criminal conduct of others."
46 United States v. McLaughlin, 910 F. Supp. 1054, 1063 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
47 The "sole or dominating purpose" test was first developed by the Second Circuit in
United States v. Dardi, 330 F.2d 316, 336 (2d Cir. 1964).
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charges already made against an indicted defendant,48 or (2) eliciting
evidence for a civil case. 49 A prosecutor also cannot use the grand jury
solely as an investigative aid in the search for a fugitive in whose testimony
the grand jury has no interest.50
IV. THE USE OF GRAND JURY SUBPOENA POWER
The rules governing the use of the federal court's criminal subpoena
power, including grand jury subpoena power, are set forth in Rule 17 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 51 Rule 17 authorizes nationwide
service of subpoenas 52 but a grand jury's subpoena authority is contingent
on issuance by the federal district court that summoned the grand jury.53
The clerk of a federal district court issues blank grand jury subpoenas
which are ready for federal prosecutors to fill-in and serve. 4 The subpoena
can order a witness to appear and give testimony55 or produce non-
48 See United States v. Wadlington, 233 F.3d 1067, 1074 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Thompson, 944 F.2d 1331, 1337 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Scott, 784 F.2d 787,
792 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Moss, 756 F.2d 329, 332 (4th Cir. 1985) ("Once a
defendant has been indicted, the government is precluded from using the grand jury for the
'sole or dominant purpose' of obtaining additional evidence against him."); United States v.
Bin Laden, 116 F. Supp. 2d 489, 491-92 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (collecting cases); United States v.
Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 1449, 1453 (D. Kan. 1994); In re Grand Jury Matter No. 86-525-5,
689 F. Supp. 454, 463 (E.D. Pa. 1987); SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW &
PRACTICE, § 9:16 n.1 (2d ed. 2004) (collecting cases); cf United States v. Avila, No. 02 CR
464-8, 2004 WL 1698800, at *1 (N.D. IlI. July 27, 2004) ("The inclusion of new defendants
or new charges in a superseding indictment undermines the suggestion that the grand jury
was used for the primary purpose of gathering evidence against a formerly indicted
defendant." (citing United States v. Badger, 983 F.2d 1443, 1458 (7th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Scott, 784 F.2d 787, 792 (7th Cir. 1986))).
49 See United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 432 (1983) ("Use ofa grand jury
proceeding to elicit evidence for use in a civil case is improper per se."); ANTITRUST
DIVISION, supra note 40, at 1-37 n.59 (citing United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356
U.S. 677 (1958)).
50 U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 22, tit. 9, § 11.120(B) (citing In re Pedro
Archuleta, 432 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); In re Wood, 430 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd
sub nim. In re Cueto, 554 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1977)).
51 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated Dec. 10, 1987, 926 F.2d 847, 854 (9th
Cir. 1991) ("Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a grand jury
may issue a subpoena.").
52 FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(e)(1).
53 Id. at 6(a)(1).
14 Id. at 17(a)(1) ("The clerk must issue a blank subpoena-signed and sealed-to the
party requesting it, and that party must fill in the blanks before the subpoena is served.").
55 A subpoena ordering a witness to appear and give testimony is referred to as a
subpoena ad testificandum. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1440 (7th ed. 1999).
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testimonial physical evidence. 56  Courts have held that properly issued
grand jury subpoenas enjoy a presumption of regularity.5 7 Unlike warrants,
subpoenas are traditionally issued without prior judicial review and
approval.58 Prosecutors should be aware of the legal requirements in this
area by consulting the local rules of the federal district in which they seek to
use subpoenas to obtain the information.
59
A. PREAPPEARANCE INTERVIEW OR REVIEW AND THE "OFFICE"
SUBPOENA
The law has not changed since 1980 in that the issuance of a grand
jury subpoena does not necessarily require prior grand jury authorization or
awareness. A prosecutor's collection of information using a grand jury
subpoena without the intended participation of the grand jury, however, is
an improper use of the grand jury. 6 1
56 A subpoena ordering the witness to produce "books, papers, documents, data or other
objects," FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(1), is referred to as subpoena duces tecum. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 55, at 1440.
57 In re Green Grand Jury Proceedings, 371 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1057 (D. Minn. 2005)
(citing United States v. R. Enter., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 300-01 (1991)); see, e.g., Nat'l
Commodity & Barter Ass'n v. United States, 951 F.2d 1172, 1174-75 (10th Cir. 1991)
(citing First Nat'l Bank of Tulsa v. United States Dep't of Justice, 865 F.2d 217, 219 (10th
Cir. 1989)); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 920 F.2d 235, 244 (4th Cir. 1990); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings Involving Vickers, 38 F. Supp. 2d 159, 163 (D.N.H. 1998) (citing In re
Lopreato, 511 F.2d 1150, 1152 (lst Cir. 1975)).
58 See, e.g., United States v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053, 1077 (6th Cir. 1993).
59 For example, prior judicial approval is required before subpoenaing certain court
information, see, e.g., N.D. ILL. L. CRIM. R. 32.1, 57.2 (2003), or an attorney to appear before
the grand jury when the prosecutor seeks the attorney to testify about information related to
the attorney's client. See In re Impounded, 241 F.3d 308, 315 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing PA.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.10).
The United States Attorneys' Manual does not require prior judicial approval for the
issuance of a subpoena to an attorney but does require prior approval by the Assistant
Attorney General of the Criminal Division before a grand jury subpoena may be issued to an
attorney seeking information related to the attorney's representation of a client or fees paid
by the client. U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 22, tit. 9, § 11.140.
60 See First Nat'l Bank of Tulsa, 865 F.2d at 220; Doe v. DiGenova, 779 F.2d 74, 80
(D.C. Cir. 1985) ("U.S. Attorney may 'fill in blank grand jury subpoenas without actual
prior grand jury authorization"' (quoting United States v. Santucci, 674 F.2d 624, 627 (7th
Cir. 1982))); United States v. Kleen Laundry & Cleaner, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 519, 523
(E.D.N.Y. 1974) ("Absence of a sitting grand jury when a subpoena is issued is not
disturbing if return date is set for a day when grand jurors would be in session.").
61 Lopez v. Dep't of Justice, 393 F.3d 1345, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("The prosecutor may
issue the subpoena without the knowledge of the grand jury, but his authority to do so is
grounded in the grand jury investigation, not the prosecutor's own inquiry. Federal
prosecutors have no authority to issue grand jury subpoenas independent of the grand jury."
(citations omitted)); United States v. Smith, 687 F.2d 147, 151-52 (6th Cir. 1982); FEDERAL
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Grand jury subpoenas cannot be served for the exclusive purpose of
securing an "office interview" with a witness when the prosecutor does not
intend to have grand jury participation.62 The ABA's Prosecution Function
Standards explicitly discouraged the practice of "office subpoenas ' 63 while
the Manual does not directly address the issue. 64 When prosecutors have
used "office subpoenas" federal courts have hesitated to dismiss an
indictment unless the defendant can show that a resulting prejudice has
occurred.6 5
It is proper for prosecutors to conduct valid interviews prior to a grand
jury appearance to assist in the grand jury process. It is also permissible for
the witness to provide a voluntary pre-appearance interview with the
prosecutor after being served with the grand jury subpoena. 66 Voluntary
pre-appearance interviews can assist a witness in determining his or her
status in the investigation and the prosecutor can determine if the witness
has information of value for the grand jury.67 In evaluating whether a
PROCEDURE, LAWYERS EDITION 22:754 ("[Flederal prosecutors have no authority to issue
grand jury subpoenas independent of the grand jury .... [I]t is the court's process which
summons the witness to attend and give testimony before a grand jury, and it is the court
which must compel the witness to testify if, after appearing, the witness refuses to do so.").
62 United States v. Wadlington, 233 F.3d 1067, 1075 (8th Cir. 2000) ("[Rule 17(a)] does
not authorize the Government to use grand jury subpoenas to compel prospective grand jury
witnesses to attend private interviews with government agents." (citing United States v.
LaFuente, 991 F.2d 1406, 1411 (8th Cir. 1993))); United States v. Villa-Chaparro, 115 F.3d
797, 804 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Elliott, 849 F.2d 554, 557 (1 1th Cir. 1988) (citing
United States v. DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972, 985 (3d Cir. 1976)); United States v. Martino, 825
F.2d 754, 759 (3d Cir. 1987).
63 STANDARDS FOR CRIMrNAL JUSTICE, supra note 26, § 3-3.1(e) (1993) ("A prosecutor
should not secure the attendance of persons for interviews by use of any communication
which has the appearance or color of a subpoena or similar judicial process unless the
prosecutor is authorized by law to do so."). See generally BENNETT L. GERSHMAN,
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 3:2-3:24 (2d ed. 2005) (discussing prosecutorial misuses of
grand jury subpoenas).
64 Section 9-11.140 of the US. Attorneys' Manual, entitled "Limitation on Grand Jury
Subpoenas," does not discuss the practice of "office subpoenas." U.S. ATTORNEYS'
MANUAL, supra note 22, tit. 9, § 11.140. The U.S. Attorneys' Manual does recognize that a
grand jury's power is limited by its function of the possible return of an indictment. Id. tit. 9,
§ 11.120 (citing Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956)).
65 See Villa-Chaparro, 115 F.3d at 804; LaFuente, 991 F.2d at 1411.
66 Lopez, 393 F.3d at 1350 ("A prosecutor may interview a potential grand jury witness
either as part of a 'screening' process in advance of actual grand jury testimony or as part of
the prosecution's own investigation.") (citations omitted); United States v. Pang, 362 F.3d
1187, 1194-95 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Nothing prohibits a subpoenaed grand jury witness from
voluntarily consenting to an interview." (citing United States v. Duncan, 570 F.2d 292, 293
(9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam))).
67 United States v. Burke, 856 F.2d 1492, 1495 (1 1th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) ("The
United States Attorney must regularly interview witnesses prior to appearances before the
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subpoena was issued as a pretext for an impermissible office interview,
courts have considered the following factors: (1) whether coercive tactics
were used to secure the pre-appearance interview, 68 (2) whether the pre-
appearance interview was in relationship to a scheduled grand jury
appearance, 69 and (3) whether it is a routine practice for a witness to appear
70first at the U.S. Attorney's office prior to an appearance in the grand jury.
If a prosecutor believes that a subpoenaed witness need not testify before
the grand jury, it is good practice for the prosecutor, acting as the grand
jury's adviser, to inform the grand jury of this fact to ensure that an accurate
record of the advisement is made under Rule 6(e)(1).
B. REQUIRING PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND OTHER
MATERIALS
71
Non-testimonial evidence such as a DNA sample, fingerprints,
handwriting exemplars, or financial records typically requires analysis to be
useful to the grand jury. Courts have held that a prosecutor may first have
the subpoenaed materials analyzed, and can even issue the initial subpoena
when the grand jury is not in session, as long as the return date on the
grand jury to ensure that grand jurors are not burdened with duplicate information."); United
States v. Santucci, 674 F.2d 624, 632 (7th Cir. 1982) ("It can be seen that the United States
Attorney, as a practical matter, is allowed considerable leeway in attempting to prepare for a
grand jury investigation.").
68 See United States v. Wadlington, 233 F.3d 1067, 1075 (8th Cir. 2000) ("[Rule 17]
does not authorize the government to use grand jury subpoenas to compel prospective grand
jury witnesses to attend private interviews with government agents."); Villa-Chaparro, 115
F.3d at 804. See generally Hillard v. Commonwealth, 158 S.W.3d 758, 765 (Ky. 2005)
(providing collection of federal cases);
The courts have generally permitted prosecutors to meet with prospective witnesses in advance
of their appearances before the grand jury, as long as the interviews with the prosecutors are
optional, and as long as the witnesses are given the choice to appear before the grand jury rather
than submit to an interview.
BEALE, supra note 48, § 6:2.
69 Wadlington, 233 F.3d at 1075 (witnesses arrived at U.S. Attorney's office a full day
before scheduled grand jury appearance, suggesting to the court that the subpoenas were not
issued merely for logistical purposes, but instead were improperly used); United States v.
Tropp, 725 F. Supp. 482, 486 (D. Wyo. 1989) (evaluating whether the return date on the
subpoena was for a time when the grand jury was scheduled to be sitting).
70 United States v. Wilson, 614 F.2d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir. 1980) (witnesses properly
directed to U.S. Attorney's office to address administrative issues before testifying before
the grand jury).
71 See U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 22, tit. 9, § 11.254, for the Department of
Justice's "Guidelines for Handling Documents Obtained by the Grand Jury."
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subpoena is for a date that the grand jury is in session.72 Furthermore, the
material may not ultimately be presented to the grand jury if the witness can
voluntarily provide the sample to the prosecutor or government agents
outside of the grand jury's presence.73 In order to avoid an abuse of the
grand jury, however, the prosecutor must have intended to obtain useable
evidence for the grand jury when the subpoenas were initially issued .7
Rule 17(c)(2) authorizes a court to quash or modify the subpoena if
compliance would be "unreasonable or oppressive. 75 A party moving to
quash a subpoena traditionally argues either that the subpoena seeks
information that is not relevant or that the information sought cannot be
disclosed because it is protected by privilege. In United States v. R.
Enterprises, Inc., the Supreme Court held that when a "subpoena is
challenged on relevancy grounds, the motion to quash must be denied
unless the district court determines that there is no reasonable possibility
that the category of materials the Government seeks will produce
information relevant to the general subject of the grand jury's
investigation." 76 "The burden of persuasion to show that a subpoena was
unreasonable lies with the party" moving to quash the production.7 7 Given
72 First Nat'l Bank of Tulsa v. United States Dep't of Justice, 865 F.2d 217, 220 (10th
Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407 (1928)); Sutton v. United States,
658 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v. Kleen Laundry & Cleaners, Inc., 381 F.
Supp. 519 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); see also In re Sealed Cases, 223 F.3d 775, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
73 See United States v. Santucci, 674 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1982).
74 United States v. Larkin, 978 F.2d 964, 968 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Settled law provides that
the grand jury has the sole authority to compel a witness to participate in a lineup, and that
the government may not short-circuit the grand jury process by obtaining its own motion a
court order to compel such appearance.") (citation omitted); United States v. Smith, 687 F.2d
147, 152 (6th Cir. 1982) (noting that the government intended to bring the witness before the
grand jury if he did not voluntarily cooperate and therefore the government was not using the
grand jury to obtain evidence that it could not otherwise lawfully obtain); In re Melvin, 546
F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1976) ("The United States Attorney's office [is not] a proper substitute for
the grand jury room [and the grand jury subpoena is not] a compulsory administrative
process of the United States Attorney's office." (quoting Durbin v. United States, 221 F.2d
520, 522 (D.C. Cir. 1954))); United States v. O'Kane, 439 F. Supp. 211, 214 (S.D. Fla.
1977) (also quoting Durbin, 221 F.2d at 522); see, e.g., In re Grand Jury
Proceedings/Subpoenas, 593 F. Supp. 92, 95 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
75 FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(2); see, e.g., United States v. Bergeson, 425 F.3d 1221, 1224
(9th Cir. 2005) ("Rule 17(c)(2) confers discretion on the district court to quash a grand jury
subpoena if compliance would be 'unreasonable or oppressive."'); In re Grand Jury, 111
F.3d 1066, 1075 (3d Cir. 1997) ("Grand juries are subject to judicial control and subpoenas
to motions to quash." (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 708 (1972))).
76 United States v. R. Enter., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991); see also In re Grand Jury
95-1, 59 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 1996); In re The August 1993 Regular Grand Jury, 854 F.
Supp. 1392 (S.D. Ind. 1993).
77 In re Impounded, 277 F.3d 407, 415 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing R. Enter., 498 U.S. at 301).
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that only the prosecutors, the investigators working with them, and the
grand jurors know the scope of the investigation, "the success rate of these
types of motions is predictably low."7 8 It is error for courts to apply the
"same requirements of relevancy, admissibility and specificity" that are
applied under Rule 17(c) for a motion to quash a trial subpoena because to
do so, "would impose an impossible burden on the grand jury, create
untoward delays, and threaten the secrecy of the grand jury." 79
A party may also challenge a grand jury subpoena on the grounds of
privilege by asserting a constitutional privilege or certain evidentiary
privileges recognized under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
such as the attorney-client privilege.8 0  The Supreme Court's pre-1980
position that, in general, grand juries must recognize certain protections of
the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments 8' has not been altered over the past
twenty-five years.
In 1972, the Supreme Court in Branzburg v. Hayes made it clear that
First Amendment protection must be considered but does not provide an
absolute protection to reporters against testifying before a grand jury.8 2
After Branzburg, the circuits have split over the question of whether some
type of qualified immunity exists for reporters in light of Branzburg.83 In
78 Constitutional Rights and the Grand Jury: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On the
Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 80 (2000) (statement of Andrew
D. Leipold, Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law).
79 In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 755 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing R. Enter., 498 U.S. at
299).
80 In re Keeper of Records, 348 F.3d 16, 23 (1st Cir. 2003) ("Despite a grand jury's
vaunted right to every man's evidence, it must, nevertheless respect a valid claim of
privilege." (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974))); In re Impounded,
241 F.3d 308, 316 (3d Cir. 2001); Coronado v. Bank Atl. Bancorp, Inc., 222 F.3d 1315, 1320
(11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Haynes, 216 F.3d 789, 798-99 (9th Cir. 2000); In re
Subpoenaed Grand Jury Witness, 171 F.3d 511, 513 (7th Cir. 1999); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, 1 F.3d 87, 94 (2d Cir. 1993).
The circuits have also split over the question of whether a party can challenge a grand jury
subpoena on the grounds that the information is restricted by a civil court protective order.
See In re Grand Jury, 286 F.3d 153, 158-59 (3d Cir. 2002) (discussing a three-way split
among the circuits over the issue). The work product doctrine may also be applicable when
the grand jury seeks to obtain information from an attorney. LAFAVE, supra note 28, §
8.6(b).
"1 Calandra, 414 U.S. at 346; Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 708 (1972) ("Grand
juries must operate within the limits of the First Amendment as well as the Fifth.").
82 408 U.S. at 667.
83 Compare In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 973-74 (D.C. Cir.
2005); United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 972 (5th Cir. 1998); In re Grand Jury
Proceeding, 810 F.2d 580, 583-86 (6th Cir. 1987) (declining to recognize a journalistic
privilege) with Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1295 (9th Cir. 1993); LaRouche v. Nat'l Broad.
Co., 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147
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recognition of the First Amendment, the Department of Justice has policies
regulating the issuance of any subpoenas to members of the news media,
including the need for prior approval from the Attorney General in certain
84situations.
As the Supreme Court made clear in 1974, a grand jury's subpoena
power is also limited by the Fourth Amendment.8 5  Fourth Amendment
issues can be implicated when the subpoena seeks to obtain evidence that
requires "a physical intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin" of the
86
subpoenaed witness . Courts have recognized that the relevant Fourth
Amendment inquiry is not whether the grand jury subpoena is supported by
probable cause but instead whether the "subject matter and scope of the




The Supreme Court has also recognized that certain Fifth Amendment
protections must be considered when the prosecutor seeks a witness's
testimony or production of documents through a grand jury subpoena.88 A
witness's voluntary decision to create business records, like a witness's
(3d Cir. 1980) (recognizing the privilege) (reported at BRENNER & LOCKHART, supra note 37,
§ 14.20.1 n.6).
84 See Judicial Administration, 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2005); U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL,
supra note 22, tit. 9, §§ 11.255, 13.400. As with other Department of Justice regulations, 28
C.F.R. § 50.10 has not been interpreted to create or recognize any legally enforceable right
in any person. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d at 974-75; In re Special
Proceeding, 373 F.3d 37, 44 n.3 (1st Cir. 2004); In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850, 853-54 (4th Cir.
1992).
" Calandra, 414 U.S. at 346 ("The grand jury is also without power to invade a
legitimate privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment. A grand jury's subpoena
duces tecum will be disallowed if it is far too sweeping in its terms to be regarded as
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.") (citations omitted).
86 In re Shabazz, 200 F. Supp. 2d 578, 581 (D.S.C. 2002) (citations omitted); see, e.g., In
re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Vickers, 38 F. Supp. 2d 159 (D.N.H. 1998); In re
Grand Jury Proceeding, 816 F. Supp. 1196 (D. Ky. 1993); Henry v. Ryan, 775 F. Supp. 247
(N.D. 111. 1991).
87 In re Vickers, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 164. The Vickers court also pointed to five factors for
determining the reasonableness of a grand jury subpoena:
(1) Does the subpoena command the production of things relevant to the investigation being
pursued by the grand jury?; (2) Does the subpoena specify with sufficient particularity the things
being sought?; (3) Is the subpoena sufficiently narrow in scope to be considered reasonable?; (4)
Has the subpoena issued for reasons other than to harass the subject; and (5) Can the subject
provide the requested evidence without unnecessary risk of personal harm (e.g., potentially
dangerous invasive surgery) and/or personal humiliation (e.g., unnecessary invasion of bodily
integrity or dignitary interests)?
Id. (citations omitted).
88 See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000); Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S.
99 (1988); United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391
(1976).
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voluntary decision to testify, does not implicate Fifth Amendment
protection because there was no compulsion at the time of the testimony or
creation of the documents. 89  However, federal courts have considered
whether the act of providing the documents in response to a subpoena may
be testimonial and therefore covered under the Fifth Amendment, because
the party producing the documents is conceding the existence of the papers
demanded along with his or her possession and control of the documents.90
When the existence of the document is a "foregone conclusion," the act of
producing the document is not testimony, and the Fifth Amendment is not
implicated because the concession adds nothing to the government's
information but is instead merely an issue of surrendering possession of the
documents. 91
C. ALLOWING TIME FOR COMPLIANCE WITH SUBPOENA
A prosecutor issuing a subpoena on behalf of the grand jury should
provide a reasonable time for the subpoenaed party to either comply with
the subpoena or be able to move in federal court to quash the subpoena.
The Department of Justice Antitrust Division Grand Jury Practice Manual,
which is a separate publication from the U.S. Attorneys' Manual, states that
as a general policy subpoenas ad testificandum should be served
approximately three weeks prior to a witness appearing to testify and
subpoena duces tecum should be served one to two months before the
deadline for the submission of the subpoenaed documents.
92
A federal prosecutor is balancing competing interests when
considering the appropriate return date on subpoenas issued on behalf of the
grand jury. A failure to provide enough time to comply can limit the
subpoena party's ability to consult an attorney in preparation for his grand
jury testimony and can also implicate the Fourth Amendment. On the other
hand, a prosecutor must counterbalance the possible harm caused by the
grant of time to comply. A subpoenaed party may use the intervening time
to destroy documents 93 or flee94 in order to avoid compliance with the
89 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Dated April 18, 2003, 383 F.3d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 2004)
(citing Doe, 465 U.S. at 610); see, e.g., Barrett v. Acevedo, 169 F.3d 1155, 1167-68 (8th Cir.
1999) (citations omitted).
90 United States v. Teeple, 286 F.3d 1047, 1049 (8th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted); see,
e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated April 9, 1996, 87 F.3d 1198, 1200 (11th Cir. 1996)
(citations omitted).
91 United States v. Norwood, 420 F.3d 888, 896 (8th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted); see,
e.g., In re Foster, 188 F.3d 1259, 1269-70 (10th Cir. 1999).
92 ANTITRUST DTvIsIoN, supra note 40, Ch. 3(B)(3).
93 An example of where this factual situation played out was in the case of United States
v. Jones, 286 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2002). Jones involved an investigation by the U.S.
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subpoena. The issuance of the subpoena also lessens the grand jury's
protection of secrecy since it announces the grand jury's existence and its
desire to obtain evidence from the subpoenaed individual.
Courts have allowed grand juries to issue "forthwith" subpoenas
ordering immediate compliance.95  A party who is served with the
"forthwith" subpoena may later seek to suppress the subpoena on Fourth
Amendment grounds.96 "Forthwith" subpoenas are not "per se illegal.
Rather, the issuance of a 'forthwith' subpoena may be justified by the facts
and circumstances of a particular case. 97 However, due to the potential
concerns surrounding its use, the Manual requires pre-approval by the U.S.
Attorney before a federal prosecutor uses a forthwith subpoena in a grand
jury investigation. 9
8
V. INSIDE THE GRAND JURY
A. THE PROSECUTOR'S ROLE AND FUNCTION
When appearing before the grand jury, a federal prosecutor has the
dual roles of both pressing for an indictment and being a legal advisor to the
grand jury.99  Additionally, "[t]he ex parte character of grand jury
Attorney's Office into possible wrongdoing by the San Francisco Human Rights
Commission's ("HRC") program for certifying minority ownership of businesses that bid on
public contracts. Id. at 1148. The U.S. Attorney's initial grand jury subpoena was issued on
June 25, 1999 and sought production of records from HRC by August 12, 1999. Id. On July
30, 1999, the U.S. Attorney's Office issued a "forthwith" grand jury subpoena and executed
an immediate search of HRC's office after being informed that documents subpoenaed under
the original subpoena were being shredded. Id.
94 Cf LAFAVE, supra note 28, § 8.7(e) (citing United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42
(2d Cir. 2003) (discussing the use of the material witness statute to detain prospective grand
jury witnesses)).
95 A "forthwith" subpoena requires the subpoenaed party to comply immediately which
usually either means the day the subpoena is served or the next day. BRENNER & LOCKHART,
supra note 37, § 14.5; see United States v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 31 (D.
Conn. 2002) (approving of the use of a "forthwith" subpoena when the government had
evidence that target of a grand jury investigation was destroying computer files related to the
grand jury investigation).
96 LAFAVE, supra note 28, § 8.7(e).
97 United States v. Lartey, 716 F.2d 955, 962 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing United States v. Re,
313 F. Supp. 442,448-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)).
98 U.S. ATTORNEYs' MANUAL, supra note 22, tit. 9, § 11.140 ("'Forthwith' subpoenas
should be used only when an immediate response is justified and then only with the prior
approval of the United States Attorney.").
99 See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 63 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing
United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J., dissenting); United
States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567, 573-74 (2d Cir. 1953) (L. Hand, J. dissenting)).
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proceedings makes it peculiarly important for a federal prosecutor to
remember that, in the familiar phrase, the interest of the United States in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done." 10 0
As to balancing the objective of these two roles, the Manual states:
In dealing with the grand jury, the prosecutor must always conduct himself or herself
as an officer of the court whose function is to ensure that justice is done and that guilt
shall not escape nor innocence suffer. The prosecutor must recognize that the grand
jury is an independent body, whose functions include not only the investigation of
crime and the initiation of criminal prosecution but also the protection of the citizenry
from unfounded criminal charges. The prosecutor's responsibility is to advise the
grand jury on the law and to present evidence for its consideration. In discharging
these responsibilities, the prosecutor must be scrupulously fair to all witnesses and
must do nothing to inflame or otherwise improperly influence the grand jury.1
0 1
The American Bar Association Prosecution Standard 3-3.5 Relations
with Grand Jury states:
(a) Where the prosecutor is authorized to act as legal advisor to the grand jury, the
prosecutor may appropriately explain the law and express an opinion on the legal
significance of the evidence but should give due deference to its status as an
independent legal body.
(b) The prosecutor should not make statements or arguments in an effort to influence
grand jury action in a manner which would be impermissible at trial before a petit
jury.
(c) The prosecutor's communications and presentations to the grand jury should be
on the record. 
102
B. WHO MAY ATTEND SESSIONS
Rule 6(d) expressly identifies who may be present while the grand jury
is in session 10 3 and while the grand jury is deliberating and voting.104
Excluded from Rule 6(d)'s listing of persons allowed to attend grand jury
100 Ciambrone, 601 F.2d at 628-29 (Friendly, J., dissenting) (quoting Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1938)); United States v. Gross, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1099 (C.D.
Cal. 1999) (citations omitted).
101 U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 22, tit. 9, § 11.010.
102 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 26, § 3-3.5.
103 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d)(1) ("The following persons may be present while the grand jury
is in session: attorneys for the government, the witness being questioned, interpreters when
needed, and a court reporter or an operator of a recording device.").
14 Id. at 6(d)(2) ("No person other than the jurors, and any interpreter needed to assist a
hearing-impaired or speech-impaired juror, may be present while the grand jury is
deliberating or voting.").
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sessions are the putative defendant, an attorney for the witness testifying
before the grand jury,'0 5 and the district court judge responsible for
supervising the grand jury. Only one witness may appear at a time before
the grand jury and a witness must leave the grand jury once he or she has
completed testifying. 0 6 Not all federal prosecutors may appear as counsel
before the grand jury.10 7 Instead, the federal attorney must be within the
definition of "an attorney for the government" set forth in Rule 1108 to be
lawfully present during proceedings before the grand jury.
The prosecutor has the responsibility to safeguard the propriety of the
grand jury's proceedings by leaving the grand jury room during the grand
105 Although an attorney for a witness is permitted to accompany the witness to the door
of the federal grand jury room and remain outside the grand jury room to be available for
consultation with the witness during his or her testimony, the attorney cannot enter into the
grand jury room. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 97 F.3d 1090, 1092-93 (8th Cir. 1996)
(citing United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976) (plurality); United States v.
Brown, 666 F.2d 1196, 1198-99 (8th Cir. 1981)); see, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
219 F.3d 175, 187 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Plache, 913 F.2d 1375, 1380 (9th Cir.
1990); United States v. Gaddy, 894 F.2d 1307, 1315 (1I1th Cir. 1990); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 859 F.2d 1021, 1024 (1st Cir. 1988); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 842 F.2d
244, 249 (10th Cir. 1988). But see Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 292 (1999) ("A grand
jury witness has no constitutional right to have counsel present during the grand jury
proceeding, and no decision of [the Supreme Court] has held that a grand jury witness has a
right to have her attorney present outside the jury room."). The witness does not have a right
to an attorney during the grand jury proceedings because the "criminal proceedings have not
been instituted against the witness and therefore the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has
not attached." Fuller v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 903, 907-08 (5th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). It
has been suggested, but not definitively held, by some courts that the grand jury witness
would have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel if adversarial judicial proceedings have
been initiated against the witness for another matter and the grand jury wished to ask the
questions of the witness that touched upon this second matter. See United States v.
Kennedy, 372 F.3d 686, 692-93 (4th Cir. 2004).
106 See BEALE, supra note 48, § 4:10.
107 See United States v. Plesinski, 912 F.2d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Nye, Nos. CR-01-82-S-BLW, CV-04-248-S-BLW, 2005 WL 1806419, at *4 (D. Idaho July
28, 2005).
108 The definition was relocated in 2002 from Rule 54 to Rule 1: "'Attorney for the
government' means: (A) the Attorney General or an authorized assistant; (B) a United States
Attorney or an authorized assistant; ... (D) any other attorney authorized by law to conduct
proceedings under these rules as a prosecutor." FED. R. CRIM. P. l(b)(1); see also U.S.
ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 22, tit. 9, § 11.241 (discussing Department of Justice
procedures relating to "an attorney for the government"). Notable cases involving whether a
prosecutor is "an attorney for the government" include United States v. Smith, 324 F.3d 922,
926 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that Special Assistant United States Attorney was "an attorney
for the government" even though his salary was paid by the State of Wisconsin), and United
States v. Foreman, 71 F.3d 1214, 1220 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that Tax Division attorney
was not "an attorney for the government" because he was not authorized to participate in the
case).
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jury's deliberations and voting. 10 9 Nor should the prosecutor partake in the
presentation of the govemment's case to the grand jury if that prosecutor
will testify as a witness before the grand jury.' 10 Additionally, a prosecutor
who has had some previous involvement with the persons under
investigation should not participate in the grand jury investigation and
should be screened from it."'
C. THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE AND PROSECUTORS'
COMMENTS TO THE GRAND JURY
Although the grand jury can consider matters brought to its attention
from sources other than the prosecutor, such as the court that impaneled it
or from the personal knowledge of a grand jury member, the grand jury's
efforts are usually focused on receiving evidence presented by an attorney
for the government. 112 The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in a
grand jury proceeding except for the privilege provisions. 13 The prosecutor
can present hearsay to the grand jury and the grand jury can use the hearsay
as the basis of its indictment. 14 The prosecutor's presentation is ex parte
and he or she can provide legal advice to the grand jury, discuss the
prosecution's strategy with grand jury and can respond to grand juror
questions. 115
109 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d)(2).
110 See United States v. Wiseman, 172 F.3d 1196, 1205 (10th Cir. 1999) ("It is not proper
for a prosecutor to testify before the grand jury."); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7
(2003).
111 See In re Grand Jury Investigation of Targets, 918 F. Supp. 1374, 1375 (S.D. Cal.
1996) (holding that the local U.S. Attorney's Office was not disqualified from participating
in a grand jury investigation because it effectively screened an Assistant U.S. Attorney who
in previous private practice had represented a target of the investigation). But see In re
Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 43 (1st Cir. 2004) (upholding a district court's decision to
appoint a special prosecutor because the district court had multiple reasons to be concerned
that the government's prosecution, even conducted by attorneys from an outside U.S.
Attorneys' office, would result in a public impression of a conflict of interest in the case).
112 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF COURTS, HANDBOOK FOR FEDERAL JURORS 2, available at
http://www.moed.uscourts.gov/Jury/FederalHandbookForGrandJurors.pdf (last visited April
9, 2006).
113 FED. R. EVID. 1 101(d)(2); United States v. John Doe, Inc. I, 481 U.S. 102, 119 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
114 United States v. Bergeson, 425 F.3d 1221, 1226 (9th Cir. 2005). The U.S. Attorneys'
Manual notes that although "[a]s a general rule, it is proper to present hearsay to the grand
jury ... [e]ach United States Attorney should be assured that hearsay evidence presented to
the grand jury will be presented on its merits so that the jurors are not mislead into believing
that the witness is giving his or her personal account." U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra
note 22, tit. 9, § 11.232.
115 ANTITRUST DIVISION, supra note 40, Ch. 4(C)(3)-(5).
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D. RECORDING OF PROCEEDINGS
As in 1980, Rule 6(e)(1) continues to require that all grand jury
proceedings, other than grand jury deliberation and voting, be recorded by a
court reporter or a suitable recording device.1 16  The attorney for the
government is ordered under Rule 6(e)(1) to retain control of the grand jury
recording, reporters' notes and any transcripts of grand jury proceedings. " 7
However, the grand jury's records, although in the government's
possession, are the court's records. 118
The 1979 Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 6(e)(1) state that the
transcribing or recording of grand jury proceedings ensures that: (1) the
defendant will be able to later impeach a government witness at trial with a
prior inconsistent statement made before the grand jury, (2) the testimony
received by the grand jury will be trustworthy, (3) potential prosecutorial
abuses are restrained, and (4) evidence will be available for use by the
prosecutor at trial." 9  Rule 6(e)(1) is in accordance with the ABA's
Prosecution Standards.12 0 The prosecutor must ensure that the grand jury
proceeding is properly recorded since parties may seek grand jury
information in the later criminal trial or in other related matters. '21
Although Rule 6(e)(1) states that an unintentional failure to make a
recording of grand jury proceedings does not affect the validity of a
prosecution, 122 prosecutors should be careful to make sure that all
discussions with the grand jurors occur on the record. A prosecutor should
not "go off the record" while before the grand jury at any time, should
minimize engaging in casual conversations with grand jurors before or after
proceedings, and should make a record of any inadvertent conversations
that occur off the record with a grand juror about an investigation the grand
jury is conducting. 123
116 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(1).
117 id.
118 Unites States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 684-85 (1958); United States v.
Penrod, 609 F.2d 1092, 1097 (4th Cir. 1979).
"9 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(1) (1979 Advisory Committee Note).
120 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 26, § 3-3.6(e) ("The prosecutor's
communications and presentations to the grand jury should be on the record.").
121 See infra Part V.I. (discussing grand jury secrecy and permissible disclosures).
122 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(1).
123 ANTITRUST DIVISION, supra note 40, Ch. 4(C)(1).
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Cases involving Rule 6(e)(1) violations have focused on the
inadvertent failure to record grand jury proceedings.' 24  Under the plain
language of Rule 6(e)(1), however, a court should deny a motion to dismiss
an indictment if the failure to record the grand jury proceedings was
inadvertent. However, Rule 6(e)(1) does not define what constitutes an
inadvertent failure to record a grand jury proceeding.
E. SUBPOENAING "TARGETS" OF THE INVESTIGATION
Through the subpoena power, grand juries can compel the attendance
of witnesses 125 including the target of a grand jury's investigation.126 A
grand jury may properly subpoena a subject 127 or a target of the
investigation and question a target about his or her involvement in the
matter under investigation. 28 Although the target can be called to testify
before the grand jury, there are ethical considerations for subpoenaing a
target because the target is a potential future criminal defendant.
The Manual advises federal prosecutors to make an effort to secure a
target's voluntary appearance in front of the grand jury before subpoenaing
124 BEALE, supra note 48, § 9:13; cf United States v. Lamoureux, 711 F.2d 745, 747 (6th
Cir. 1983) (determining that prosecutor's misplacement of grand jury record was inadvertent
and therefore dismissal of an indictment was not appropriate).
125 LAFAVE, supra note 28, § 8.3(a) ("The basic investigative advantage of the grand jury
stems from its ability to use the subpoena authority of the court that impaneled it ... and that
court's authority to hold in contempt any person who willfully refuses, without legal
justification, to comply with a subpoena's directive.").
S26 see, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345 (1974) ("The power of a
federal court to compel persons to appear and testify before a grand jury is also firmly
established. The duty to testify has long been recognized as a basic obligation that every
citizen owes his Government."); United States v. Quam, 367 F.3d 1006, 1008 (8th Cir. 2004)
("When called by the grand jury, witnesses are legally bound to give testimony." (quoting
United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 572 (1976)); United States v. Awadallah, 349
F.3d 42, 56 (2nd Cir. 2003); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Williams), 995 F.2d 1013, 1016
(11 th Cir. 1993); United States v. Bell, 902 F.2d 563, 565 (7th Cir. 1990).
127 Although often used interchangeably in the grand jury context, the terms "subject"
and "target" have different definitions in the U.S. Attorneys' Manual. The U.S. Attorneys'
Manual defines a "target" as "a person as to whom the prosecutor or the grand jury has
substantial evidence linking him or her to the commission of a crime and who, in the
judgment of the prosecutor, is a putative defendant." U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note
22, tit. 9, § 11.151. "A 'subject' of an investigation is a person whose conduct is within the
scope of the grand jury's investigation." Id.
The U.S. Attorneys' Manual also states that "[a]n officer or employee of an
organization which is a target is not automatically considered a target even if such officer's
or employee's conduct contributed to the commission of the crime by the target organization.
The same lack of automatic target status holds true for organizations which employ, or
employed, an officer or employee who is a target." Id tit. 9, § 11.151.
128 Id. tit. 9, § 11.150.
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the target to testify.'2 9 The Manual comments that the desire to have a
target voluntarily appear arises out of a concern that the subpoenaing of a
grand jury target may appear "unfair."' 130  If the prosecutor decides that a
subpoena is needed, the Manual requires the United States Attorney or the




A prosecutor should also consider the potential impact on the grand
jury caused by a target's invocation of his or her Fifth Amendment rights
before the grand jury. 132 The ABA's Prosecution Standards counsels that a
prosecutor should not compel the appearance of a witness when that witness
states in advance that he or she will invoke the constitutional privilege not
to testify unless the prosecutor intends to judicially challenge the exercise
of the privilege or to seek a grant of immunity according to the law.'33
The Manual takes a somewhat different position than the ABA
Standards. "If a 'target' of the investigation and his or her attorney state in
writing, signed by both, that the 'target' will refuse to testify by invoking
the Fifth Amendment privilege, the witness ordinarily should be excused
from testifying unless the grand jury and the United States Attorney agree
to insist on the appearance.' ' 134 The Manual goes on to state that the United




In determining whether to approve a subpoena for a "target,"' careful attention will be paid to the
following considerations: (1) the importance to the successful conduct of the grand jury's
investigation of the testimony or other information sought; (2) whether the substance of the
testimony or other information sought could be provided by other witnesses; and (3) whether the
questions the prosecutor and the grand jurors intend to ask or the other information sought would
be protected by a valid claim of privilege.
Id.
132 See generally Aaron M. Clemens, Misuse of the Grand Jury: Forcing A Putative
Defendant To Appear and Plead the Fifh Amendment, 28 U. SEATrLE L. REV. 379 (2005).
133 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 26, § 3-3.6(e).
134 U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 22, tit. 9, § 11-154. The Manual goes on to
state that
[i]n determining the desirability of insisting on the appearance of such a person, consideration
should be given to the factors which justified the subpoena in the first place, i.e., the importance
of the testimony or other information sought, its unavailability from other sources, and the
applicability of the Fifth Amendment privilege to the likely areas of inquiry.
2006] PREINDICTMENT PROSECUTORIAL CONDUCT 553
jury even if the United States Attorney is not prepared to seek a grant of
immunity for the target pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 6003.35
F. RIGHT OF PUTATIVE DEFENDANT TO TESTIFY OR PRESENT
EVIDENCE
Although a putative defendant has no right to testify in front of the
grand jury,136 the Manual encourages the prosecutor to allow voluntary
appearances by subjects and targets before the grand jury because a
prosecutor's refusal of a request to appear before the grand jury may appear
unfair. 137 As one commentator has suggested, a "savvy [defense] counsel
will not allow his 'target' clients to testify before the grand jury ... because
it is the rare target who can talk his way out of an indictment."
138
Therefore, a prosecutor should allow the putative defendant to testify as
long as (1) there is no burden on the grand jury or delay of its proceedings,
(2) the witness explicitly waives his privilege against self-incrimination on
the record before the grand jury, (3) the witness is represented by counsel or
voluntarily or knowingly appears without counsel, and (4) the witness
consents to a full examination under oath.
139
It is up to the sound discretion of the grand jury to determine whether
to allow a putative defendant to supplement his or her testimony with
testimony from third parties.140 It is also up to the grand jury as to whether
the putative defendant can read a prepared statement although there is
Department of Justice policy that opposes such a reading. 141
"' Id. tit. 9, § 11-154 ("[O]nce compelled to appear, the witness may be willing and able
to answer some or all of the grand jury's questions without incriminating himself or
herself.").
136 United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 52 (1992) ("[N]either in this country nor in
England has the suspect under investigation by the grand jury ever been thought to have a
right to testify."); United States v. Myers, 123 F.3d 350, 357 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Byron, 994 F.2d 747, 748 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Isgro, 974 F.2d 1091, 1096 (9th
Cir. 1992).
137 U.S. ATroRNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 22, tit. 9, § 11.152.
138 PAUL S. DIAMOND, FEDERAL GRAND JURY PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 221-22 (4th ed.
2001).
139 U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 22, tit. 9, § 11.152.
140 Id. The Manual also points out "[w]hen passing on such requests, it must be kept in
mind that the grand jury was never intended to be and is not properly either an adversary
proceeding or the arbiter of guilt or innocence." Id. (citing United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 343 (1974)).
141 The Department of Justice, Antitrust Division's policy is to
oppose a request by a target to submit a written request to the grand jury [because] [s]uch
statements are fundamentally self-serving, do not allow the jury to weigh the witness' credibility,
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G. WARNING "TARGETS" AND "SUBJECT" OF THE GRAND JURY
INVESTIGATION
Department of Justice policy encourages the prosecutor to notify a
target who is unaware of his status as a target of a grand jury investigation
within a reasonable time before seeking an indictment in order to afford the
target an opportunity to testify before the grand jury. 14 2 The typical means
of notification is called the "target notification letter." A target notification
letter typically informs the recipient about the existence of the grand jury
investigation, the target's status as a target of the investigation, and the
voluntary opportunity to testify before the grand jury if the target desires. 143
Department of Justice policy accords the United States Attorney
discretion 144 to notify an individual, after previously being notified that he
is a target of a grand jury investigation, that the individual is no longer
considered a target of an investigation. 45 This notice must also be tailored
to the specific case, and notice to a person who has previously been a prior
target of a grand jury investigation does not preclude recommencement of
the investigation without additional notice of the new investigation.1
46
Department of Justice policy also requires prosecutors to provide a
series of warnings to targets and subjects of the grand jury investigation as
to their rights as a witness if they appear to testify before the grand jury.147
and cannot ordinarily be used to develop a case for perjury or false declaration, unless the
statement is made under penalty of perjury.
ANTITRUST DIVISION, supra note 40, Ch. 4(F)(4)(d).
142 U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 22, tit. 9, § 1 1.153. However, the Manual
does not counsel for notification "in routine clear cases or when such action might jeopardize
the investigation or prosecution because of the likelihood of flight, destruction or fabrication
of evidence, endangerment of other witnesses, undue delay or otherwise would be
inconsistent with the ends ofjustice." Id.
143 BEALE, supra note 48, § 6:32.
144 The United States Attorney can decline to provide the notification if the notification
would adversely affect the integrity of the investigation, the grand jury process or other
appropriate reason. U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 22, tit. 9, § 11.155.
145 Notification of discontinuation of target status may be appropriate when (1) the
individual was previously notified that he was a target of the investigation and (2) the
investigation involving the individual has been discontinued without an indictment being
returned charging the individual. Id. tit. 9, § 11.155.
146 id.
141 Id. tit. 9, § 11.151 ("It is the policy of the Department of Justice to advise a grand jury
witness of his or her rights if such witness is a 'target' or 'subject' of a grand jury
investigation."). The previous Department of Justice policy was to give warning to all
witnesses regardless of their status instead of just to targets and subjects of the grand jury
investigation. See BEALE, supra note 48, § 6:24.
The ABA's position is that
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The prosecutor must provide the warnings148 on the record pursuant to Rule
6(e)(1) and the witness should be asked to affirm that he or she understands
the warnings. 
149
Federal courts have not definitively held what type of warning is
constitutionally required in order to inform a witness of his or her rights
when appearing before the grand jury and therefore there is some
uncertainty in this area of the law. 150 Some circuits have held that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination applies to
witnesses appearing before the grand jury. 151 The Supreme Court in the
Miranda case itself held that pre-interrogation warnings are required for
custodial interrogations.152 Given that the Supreme Court's indications in
dicta and at least one plurality opinion that less than full Miranda warnings
if the prosecutor believes that a witness is a potential defendant, the prosecutor should not seek
to compel the witness's testimony before the grand jury without informing the witness that he or
she may be charged and that the witness should seek independent legal advice concerning his or
her rights.
STANDARDS FOR CRIMrNAL JUSTICE, supra note 26, § 3-3.6(d) (1993).
148 The Manual refers to the warnings given to the witness as the "Advice of Rights."
U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 22, tit. 9, § 11.151. The "Advice of Rights" given to
the witness are
(1) the grand jury is conducting an investigation of possible violations of Federal Criminal laws
involving: (State here the general subject matter of inquiry, e.g., conducting an illegal gambling
business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955), (2) you may refuse to answer any questions if a
truthful answer to the question would tend to incriminate you, (3) anything that you do say may
be used against you by the grand jury or in a subsequent legal proceeding, (4) if you have
retained counsel, the grand jury will permit you a reasonable opportunity to step outside the
grand jury room to consult with counsel if you so desire.
Id. The Advice of Rights also includes a supplemental warning given to targets that their
"conduct is being investigated for possible violation of federal criminal law." Id.
149 id.
150 An exception is in the area of target warnings where the federal courts have
definitively decided that a warning to a witness that he or she is the target of the grand jury's
inquiry is not constitutionally required. See United States v. Bollin, 264 F.3d 391, 414 (4th
Cir. 2001); United States v. Myers, 123 F.3d 350, 354-55 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Goodwin, 57 F.3d 815, 818 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Gillespie, 974 F.2d 796, 800
(7th Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 189 (1977); United States
v. Burke, 781 F.2d 1234, 1245 (7th Cir. 1985)).
151 United States v. Kennedy, 372 F.3d 686, 691 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v. Gomez,
237 F.3d 238, 240 (3d Cir. 2000); Myers, 123 F.3d at 359 ("[lt is well established that the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination extends to grand jury proceedings.")
(citing United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 49 (1992); United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 346 (1992); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562-63 (1892)).
152 Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 661 (2004) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 458 (1966)).
556 JAMES F. HOLDERMAN& CHARLES B. REDFERN [Vol.96
may survive constitutional scrutiny,' 53 it is not hard to predict that full
Miranda warnings in the grand jury may not be constitutionally necessary.
Without deciding the extent of the Fifth Amendment's application to grand
jury proceedings, the federal courts that have considered the issue to date
have held that the Department of Justice's "Advice of Rights" warning
given to grand jury witnesses is sufficient. 154 Regardless of the extent of
the Fifth Amendment rights applicable to grand jury proceedings, the
Supreme Court has held that a violation of a witness's Fifth Amendment
rights does not require the exclusion of the witness's false statement during
his perjury trial. 15
5
Traditionally, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been held to
be inapplicable in the grand jury since adversary judicial proceedings have
not yet commenced. However, the "right to counsel is offense specific,"
' 156
and therefore a witness's Sixth Amendment rights may apply in the grand
jury if the prosecutor seeks to question the witness about events relating to
an alleged offense in which adversary judicial proceedings have already
commenced.
153 See, e.g., Myers, 123 F.3d at 360 (citing United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181,
186 (1977)); United States v. Gillespie, 974 F.2d 796, 802 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing United
States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 86 (1977); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564,
582 n.7 (1974) (plurality opinion)).
154 See, e.g., Myers, 123 F.3d at 361-62; Gillespie, 974 F.2d at 803. Courts of appeal
have also held that the United States Attorney Office's failure to provide the written "Advice
of Rights form" to the witness before his testimony, although a violation of Department of
Justice policy, does not require the suppression of the grand jury testimony or dismissal of
the indictment when the Assistant United States Attorney provided an oral warning to the
witness before the witness testified before the grand jury. United States v. Long, 977 F.2d
1264, 1276 (8th Cir. 1992); see United States v. Bollin, 264 F.3d 391, 414 (4th Cir. 2001)
(warnings were constitutionally adequate when grand jury witness was informed of his right
not to incriminate himself, his right to counsel, and that anything he said could be used
against him); Myers, 123 F.3d 350 (prosecutor's warning was constitutionally adequate
when prosecutor orally warned the target that he had a right not to answer any questions that
could incriminate him and that his answers could be used to convict him of a crime, even
though the target did not receive an "Advice of Rights form"); United States v. Goodwin, 57
F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 1995) (prosecutor's warning was constitutionally adequate when
prosecutor orally warned the target that he had a right not to answer any questions that could
incriminate him, even though the prosecutor did not warn the target that his answers could be
used to convict him of a crime, and the target did not receive an "Advice of Rights form")
see also United States v. Quam, 367 F.3d 1006 (8th Cir. 2004) (no constitutional violation
when the Assistant United States Attorney failed to inform a grand jury witness of her right
against self-incrimination or any right to consult counsel).
155 Kennedy, 372 F.3d at 694-95 (citing United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174, 178-79
(1977); Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 576-78, 582-84 (plurality opinion)).
156 Kennedy, 372 F.3d at 692 (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991)).
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H. THE DUTY TO PRESENT FAVORABLE EVIDENCE TO THE GRAND
JURY
As discussed in the 1980 article, 157 since a putative defendant has no
right to present any evidence to the grand jury, it is up to the prosecutor to
decide whether to present evidence favorable to the putative defendant to
the grand jury.158 The Department of Justice's policy is that a prosecutor
must disclose to the grand jury, before seeking an indictment, "substantial
evidence that directly negates the guilt of the subject of the investigation"
when the prosecutor is "personally aware" of that evidence. 159 The ABA
Prosecution Standards go further by prohibiting the prosecutor from
knowingly not disclosing favorable evidence to the grand jury.'1 60
Despite Department of Justice policy, the law is settled that a
prosecutor is not constitutionally required to include exculpatory evidence
in the presentation to the grand jury. 6 1 Once the grand jury indictment is
returned and the case proceeds through the pretrial discovery stage, the
prosecutor faces the due process requirement of having to disclose this
same material pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 162 and to
the Supreme Court's decision in Brady v. Maryland, 163 which preceded the
1980 Article and was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in its 1985 decision
of United States v. Bagley.164  Thus, a prosecutor who fails to disclose
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury not only violates Department of
Justice policy but also will not gain any advantage in the trial of the case.
I. REQUIREMENT THAT PROSECUTORS MAINTAIN GRAND JURY
SECRECY
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized the importance of
secrecy in the grand jury system.165 Rule 6(e)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of
157 See The 1980 Article, supra note 4, at 23-24.
158 See infra Part VF.
159 U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 22, tit. 9, § 11.233.
160 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 26, § 3-3.6(b) (1993) ("No prosecutor
should knowingly fail to disclose to the grand jury evidence which tends to negate guilt or
mitigate the offense.").
161 United States v. Gilbert, 198 F.3d 1293, 1304 (1 1th Cir. 1999) (citing United States v.
Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51 (1992)); see, e.g., United States v. Angel, 355 F.3d 462, 475 (6th
Cir. 2004); United States v. Haynes, 216 F.3d 789, 798 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Regan, 103 F.3d 1072, 1081 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Stout, 965 F.2d 340, 343-44
(7th Cir. 1992)).
162 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16,26.2.
163 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
"6 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985).
165 The reasons for grand jury secrecy include:
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Criminal Procedure imposes the requirement of grand jury secrecy on
specified individuals. 166  Rule 6(e) also requires a court to close any
ancillary court hearing' 67 and seal any record, order and subpoena
168
necessary to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of a matter occurring
before the grand jury. The seal protecting grand jury secrecy "must be kept
... to the extent and as long as necessary to prevent unauthorized disclosure
of matter occurring before the grand jury.' ' 16 9  Rule 6(e) also provides for
acceptable disclosures under the exceptions section in Rule 6(e)(3). 70
(1) To prevent the escape of those who indictment may be contemplated; (2) to insure the utmost
freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent persons subject to indictment or
their friends from importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent subornation of perjury or
tampering with the witnesses who may testify before the grand jury and later appear at the trial
of those indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have
information with respect to the commission of crimes; (5) to protect [an] innocent accused who
is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation, and from the
expense of standing trial where there was no probability of guilt.
United States v. John Doe, Inc., 481 U.S. 102, 110 (1987) (quoting United States v. Procter
& Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 n.6 (1958)); see, e.g., United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc.,
463 U.S. 418, 424 (1983); Illinois v. Abbot & Assocs., Inc., 460 U.S. 557, 566 n.ll (1983);
Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 219 n.10 (1979); cf In re Motions of
Dow Jones & Co., 142 F.3d 496, 499 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("There is no First Amendment right
of access to grand jury proceedings.... A grand jury is a body that conducts its business in
private.").
Grand jury secrecy also promotes:
(1) the government's need to know what transpires before the grand jury to prosecute cases
effectively and to assist the grand jury in its deliberations; (2) the need to protect the grand jury
process from prosecutorial abuse; and (3) the need for government attorneys to adhere to
established procedures that limit the government's power of discovery and investigation.
ANTITRUST DIvSION, supra note 40, Ch. 2(A)(1) (citing collection of case law).
166 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(B)
Unless these rules provide otherwise, the following persons must not disclose a matter occurring
before the grand jury: (i) a grand jury; (ii) an interpreter; (iii) a court reporter; (iv) an operator of
a recording device; (v) a person who transcribes recorded testimony; (vi) an attorney for the
government; or (vii) a person to whom disclosure is made under Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) or (iii).
167 Id. at 6(e)(5). Ancillary court proceedings are non-grand jury court proceedings that
are covered by grand jury secrecy and therefore closed to the public due to the need to
protect from the unauthorized disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury. See In
re Newark Morning Ledger Co., 260 F.3d 217, 221 (3d Cir. 2001); In re Motions of Dow
Jones & Co., 142 F.3d at 500-02; United States v. Smith, 123 F.3d 140, 148-52 (3d Cir.
1997).
168 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(6).
169 Id. "The secrecy protection of Rule 6(e)(6) endures beyond the term of the grand
jury." In re Federal Grand Jury Proceedings 03-01, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1220 (D. Or.
2004) (citing Abbott & Assocs., 460 U.S. at 566 n.11; AFL-CIO v. FEC, 333 F.3d 168, 175
(D.C. Cir. 2003)).
170 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3).
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A knowing violation of grand jury secrecy may be punished by
contempt of court. 71 The requirement of grand jury secrecy, however, only
applies to individuals covered under Rule 6(e)(2)(B)1 72 and to "matters
occurring before the grand jury."'173 Notably, witnesses are not covered by
171 Id. at 6(e)(7); see, e.g., United States v. Girardi, 62 F.3d 943, 945 (7th Cir. 1995)
(grand juror convicted of contempt of court, bribery, and obstruction of justice and sentenced
to ninety-seven months' imprisonment for unlawfully disclosing grand jury information in
exchange for money); United States v. Holloway, 991 F.2d 370, 371 (7th Cir. 1993) (grand
juror pleaded guilty to one count of criminal contempt of court and sentenced to seven days
of home confinement as part of a two-year period of probation when grand juror violated
secrecy requirement by discussing ongoing federal drug investigation with a person who
turned out to be a confidential government informant); United States v. Smith, 815 F.2d 24
(6th Cir. 1987) (DEA agent convicted of contempt of court for disclosure of grand jury
witnesses' identities and substance of their testimony to a newspaper reporter); United States
v. Smith, 992 F. Supp. 743 (D.N.J. 1998); cf United States v. Bellomo, 944 F. Supp. 1160,
1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that accidental disclosure of 6(e) material is not punishable
by contempt of court).
172 An interesting case illustrating the extent of who is covered by grand jury secrecy and
the ability to punish violations of grand jury secrecy under contempt of court is United States
v. Forman, 71 F.3d 1214 (6th Cir. 1995). Theodore Forman worked in the U.S. Department
of Justice as a trial attorney in the criminal enforcement section of the Tax Division in 1990
in Washington, D.C. Id at 1215. Forman's office mate at the Tax Division was involved in
a criminal tax investigation of a reputed mafia leader in Detroit, Michigan, Forman's
hometown. Id. Forman's office mate kept grand jury material from the investigation in an
open location in the office thus allowing Forman to make a photocopy of grand jury material
in the case including an IRS Special Agent's report. Id. at 1215-17. Forman then delivered
the copy of the grand jury material to an alleged mafia leader under investigation by the
grand jury. Id. at 1217.
At trial, Forman argued that he acted under duress because the mafia official had
threatened to harm his family. Id. Forman was found guilty of one count of criminal
contempt of court but not guilty on one count of obstruction of justice. Id. at 1217. The
Sixth Circuit reserved the criminal contempt of court conviction because Forman was not
covered under the listing of people covered by the requirement of grand jury secrecy under
Rule 6(e)(2)(B). Id. at 1217. Although Forman was a government attorney, he did not meet
the definition of a "attorney for the government" under Rule 6(e)(2)(B)(vi) because he was
not authorized to have access to the grand jury material. Id. at 1219-20. The government
was, however, able to obtain a conviction against Forman for one count of conveying
government property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641. United States v. Forman, 180 F.3d 766
(6th Cir. 1999).
The Forman case is instructive in that it demonstrates that the ability to prosecute for
contempt of court is limited to those parties covered under the secrecy requirements of Rule
6(e)(2)(B). However, the government can prosecute for other crimes, such as obstruction of
justice, bribery or unauthorized transfer of government property, even if contempt of court is
not available.
The Department of Justice Criminal Division issued a memorandum on the subject of
grand jury secrecy requirements in the wake of the Forman case. The substance of that
memorandum is contained at U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 22, tit. 9, § 156.173 FED. R. CR1M. P. 6(E)(2)(B).
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Rule 6(e)'s grand jury secrecy requirement.' 74 A prosecutor may, however,
ask a witness not to make disclosures, 175 and the witness, unless compelled
by a court order, may refuse to reveal both that he testified before the grand
jury and the substance of the testimony outside of the grand jury.1 76 The
Department of Justice Antitrust Division Grand Jury Manual states that the
grand jury foreman or government attorney should be absolutely clear that
it is only a request, and that there is no express or implied coercion, when a
witness is requested not to make unnecessary disclosures of his or her grand
jury testimony. 177
Rule 6(e) does not define what is a "matter occurring before the grand
jury" 178 despite the fact that the concept is a central part of Rule 6(e)'s
secrecy requirement. Federal courts have held that if the information or
item would reveal anything about the substance of the grand jury
investigation, the information or item is subject to Rule 6(e)'s secrecy
requirement. 179 The mere fact that an item was submitted to a grand jury, or
174 United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 425 (1983) ("Witnesses are not
under [Rule 6(e)(2)'s secrecy] prohibition unless they also happen to fit into one of the
enumerated classes."). See, e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Boeing Co., 393 F. Supp. 2d
1276, 1279-80 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (citing In re Subpoena (Univ. of Fla. Athletic Program), 864
F.2d 1559, 1564 (11th Cir. 1989)); S.E.C. v. Oakford Corp., 141 F. Supp. 2d 435, 437
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); In re Am. Historical Ass'n, 49 F. Supp. 2d 274, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); In re
Catfish Antitrust Litig., 164 F.R.D. 191, 193 n.2 (N.D. Miss. 1995) (citing McDonnell v.
United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1246 (3d Cir. 1993)); In re Grand Jury Investigation (90-3-2),
748 F. Supp. 1188, 1195 n.7 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (citing In re Investigation Before April 1975
Grand Jury, 531 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1976)); FED. R. EvID. 6(e) advisory committee's note
(1944) ("The rule does not impose any obligation of secrecy on witnesses."). But see In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 417 F.3d 18, 26 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that Rule 6(e)(2)(A) sets a
default rule of permitting disclosure of grand jury testimony by a witness but the Rule still
leaves courts the authority to use their inherent powers to fashion restrictions on the witness
disclosing his or her testimony in "particular and compelling circumstances"); Univ. of Fla.
Athletic Program, 864 F.2d at 1564 (11 th Cir. 1989) ("We hold that the district court had the
authority to prevent witnesses from disclosing materials prepared for or testimony given in
the grand jury proceedings or related proceedings."); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum, 797 F.2d 676, 680 (8th Cir. 1986).
175 LAFAVE, supra note 28, § 8.5(d).
176 United States ex. rel. Robinson v. Northrop Corp., No. 89 C 6111, 1998 WL 183903,
at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 14, 1998) (citing Bd. of Educ. of Evanston Twp. High School No. 202 v.
Admiral Heating & Ventilation, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 600, 604 (N.D. Ill. 1981)).
177 ANTITRUST DIVISION, supra note 40, ch. 2(A)(5).
178 In other parts, Rule 6(e) uses the phrase "grand-jury matter." FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3).
179 See In re Sealed Case No. 99-3091, 192 F.3d 995, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("Matters
occurring before the grand jury . . . encompass 'not only what has occurred and what is
occurring, but also what is likely to occur,' including 'the identities of witnesses or jurors,
the substance of testimony as well as actual transcripts, the strategy or direction of the
investigation, the deliberations or questions of jurors, and the like."' (quoting In re Motions
of Dow Jones & Co., 142 F.3d 496, 500 (D.C. Cir. 1998))); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 103
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is somehow related to a grand jury, is not sufficient by itself to mean that
the item is covered by grand jury secrecy. 80 Documents provided to the
grand jury, government memoranda, interviews, subpoenas, names of
witnesses and the grand jury's ministerial records may or may not be
"matters occurring before the grand jury" depending on the information
contained in the item, the reason for the creation of the item, the extent that
the item reveals information about the grand jury, and whether the
information was obtained by the government through the grand jury or a
second unrelated matter. 8 '
Grand jury secrecy does not automatically mean that the matter will
remain secret forever since appropriate disclosures are permitted by Rule
6(e)(3), other rules of federal criminal procedure,182 and various federal
statutes. 183 As one commentator has written, "[1]ike the hearsay rule, the
rule of grand jury secrecy is rife with exceptions. Although these
F.3d 234, 239 (2d Cir. 1996) ("The determination of whether a particular matter is related to
a matter occurring before a grand jury is one that depends entirely upon a fact-specific
inquiry and the district court's judgment."); United States v. Phillips, 843 F.2d 438, 441
(1 Ith Cir. 1988) ("The term 'matters occurring before a grand jury' has been defined to
include anything that will reveal what transpired during the grand jury proceedings.")
(citations omitted); United States v. Smith, 992 F. Supp. 743, 753 (D.N.J. 1998) (quoting
United States v. Smith, 787 F.2d 111, 115 (3d Cir. 1986)); In re Grand Jury Investigation,
630 F.2d 996, 1000 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that a matter occurring before the grand jury
includes the "essence of what takes place in the jury room, in order to preserve the freedom
and integrity of the deliberative process."); LAFAVE, supra note 28, § 8.5(c) ("The first
lesson of the federal precedent is that the phrase 'matter occurring before the grand jury' is a
term of art, not to be construed literally as encompassing only events that have taken place
before the grand jury."); Brian L. Porto, Annotation, What Are "Matters Occurring Before
Grand Jury" Within Prohibition of Rule 6(e) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 154
A.L.R. FED. 385 (2005) ("[Rule 6(e)] protects any information that would reveal the
identities of grand jury members or witnesses, the substance of testimony, the strategy or
direction of the investigation, the grand juror's deliberations or questions, or any comparable
matter.").
180 See United States v. Lopez, 393 F.3d 1345, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("There is no per
se rule against disclosure of any and all information which has reached the grand jury
chambers.") (quoting Senate of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Dep't of Justice, 823
F.2d 574, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
181 See Porto, supra note 179 (providing a collection of cases where the courts have
found these items either to be or not to be, "matters occurring before the grand jury"); see,
e.g., ANTITRUST DIVISION, supra note 40, ch. 2(B)(2) ("The courts differ widely as to the
extent that documents are considered 'matters occurring before the grand jury."').
182 A criminal defendant will gain access to certain grand jury material through pretrial
discovery. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16, 26.2.
183 In re Grand Jury Matter, 682 F.2d 61, 63 (3d Cir. 1982) ("[G]rand jury secrecy does
not foreclose from all future revelations to proper authorities the same information or
documents which were presented to the grand jury.... Secrecy is not absolute, and Rule 6(e)
has built-in exceptions.") (citations omitted).
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exceptions have liberalized disclosure, they are strictly construed: the
presumption in favor of grand jury secrecy remains strong.',1
8 4
Rule 6(e)(3)'s permissible disclosures are subdivided between those
allowed without prior court authorization,185 and those that require a court
order before the government attorney can make the disclosure.
86
Disclosures that can be made without a court order generally allow such
material to be used in investigating criminal conduct.' 8 7  Disclosures
requiring a court order authorize disclosure of grand jury material in
relation to other proceedings.
The district court may also authorize disclosure of grand jury materials
if the disclosure is preliminary to or in connection with a judicial
proceeding, 88 is to a defendant seeking to dismiss an indictment because of
a matter occurring before the grand jury 89 or is at the request of the
prosecutor for use in other investigations involving the enforcement of
domestic, tribal, foreign, or military criminal law. 190 A petition to the court
may require prior notice to affected third parties, or may be obtained ex
parte by agreement without prior notice, depending on the information
sought and whether the government is the moving party.' 9 ' A court
evaluating the disclosure request must also balance several interests when
determining whether to allow the disclosure. 1
92
184 PAUL S. DIAMOND, FEDERAL GRAND JURY PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 286 (4th ed.
2001); see, e.g., In re Sealed Cases, 250 F.3d 764, 768 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("Congress and the
[Supreme] Court have consistently stood ready to defend grand jury secrecy against
unwarranted intrusion. In the absence of a clear indication in a status or Rule, [a court] must
always be reluctant to conclude that a breach of this secrecy has been authorized.") (quoting
United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 425 (1983)).
185 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A)-(D).
186 Id. at 6(e)(3)(F)-(G).
187 See Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. at 418 (Department of Justice attorney working on
grand jury matter cannot disclose grand jury information to a Department of Justice attorney
working on a related civil case without prior court approval); United States v. Pimental, 380
F.3d 575, 594-96 (1st Cir. 2004) (discussing the history of Rule 6(e)(3)(ii) authorization of
disclosure to non Department of Justice personnel assisting Department of Justice Attorneys
in a grand jury investigation); In re Sealed Cases, 250 F.3d at 764; In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, 175 F.3d 332, 337 (4th Cir. 1999); Unites States v. Forman, 71 F.3d 1214, 1218
(6th Cir. 1995); U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 22, tit. 9, § 727 (discussing
authorized disclosures under Rule 6(e)(3)).
188 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(i).
189 Id at 6(e)(3)(E)(ii).
190 Id. at 6(e)(3)(E)(iii)-(v).
'9' Id. at 6(e)(3)(F).
192 A matter occurring before a grand jury may not be disclosed unless there is a "particularized
need" therefor; that is, only if the "material [sought] is needed to avoid a possible injustice in
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J. SUBMISSION OF THE PROPOSED INDICTMENT TO THE GRAND
JURY
As mandated by the Constitution, the grand jury's return of an
indictment is essential for the prosecution of capital and infamous crimes to
proceed in court.1 93  The grand jury may also report the results of its
investigation pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(f) to a
magistrate judge in open court. A grand jury's decision to return an
indictment is known as a "true bill" while the grand jury's decision not to
return an indictment is a "no true bill." Both the grand jury and the
prosecutor must participate in the process of approving the proposed
indictment. A minimum of twelve of the quorum of sixteen to twenty-three
grand jurors must vote in favor of the indictment for it to be returned,1 94 and
the indictment must be "signed by an attorney for the government."
' 95
As a practical matter, the prosecutor working with the grand jury on
the investigation prepares the proposed indictment for the grand jury's
consideration. A question arises as to whether the prosecutor improperly
influences the grand jury's deliberations if the prosecutor has pre-signed the
proposed indictment that is presented to the grand jury. To alleviate any
question of improper influence, a prosecutor should not sign the proposed
indictment before submitting it to the grand jury, but should allow the grand
jury to arrive at its own decision whether to return the indictment. Despite
the fact that the presigning of an indictment may be a questionable practice
that diminishes the grand jury's independence, courts have refused to
dismiss such an indictment. Moreover, the grand jury is already aware of
the prosecutor's position in favor of returning an indictment at the time of
the grand jury's consideration of a proposed indictment. In addition, the
mere fact that the prosecutor has already signed the proposed indictment
does not prevent the grand jury from exercising its independent authority to
refuse returning an indictment.' 
96
another judicial proceeding ... the need for disclosure is greater than the need for continued
secrecy, and... the[] request is structured to cover only material so needed."
In re Sealed Case, 250 F.3d at 771 (alterations in original) (quoting Douglas Oil Co. of Calif.
v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979)); see, e.g., Shields v. Twiss, 389 F.3d 142,
147-48 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Aisenberg, 358 F.3d 1327, 1348-49 (11th Cir.
2004); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 103 F.3d at 239-40; In re Grand Jury Investigation, 55
F.3d 350, 354-55 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Nix, 21 F.3d 347, 351 (9th Cir. 1994).
193 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
194 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(f).
195 Id. at 7(c)(1).
196 United States v. Laboy, 909 F.2d 581, 585 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Krasner,
841 F. Supp. 649, 654 (M.D. Pa. 1993); United States v. Gakoumis, 624 F. Supp. 655, 657
(E.D. Pa. 1985) (reported in BRENNER & LOCKHART, supra note 37, § 20.5.8 n.2).
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VI. OUTSIDE THE GRAND JURY ROOM
A. INTERFERENCE WITH DEFENSE INVESTIGATION
The ABA's Prosecution Function Standards advises prosecutors not to
engage in conduct that obstructs communication between prospective trial
witnesses and defense counsel. 197  The federal courts have held "that
judicial or prosecutorial intimidation that dissuades a potential defense
witness from testifying for the defense can, under circumstances, violate the
defendant's right to present a defense."198 Instructions by any lawyer to a
witness not to cooperate with the other side or to talk to lawyers from the
other side are improper. A witness is free to talk or not to talk to either side
of a criminal case unless otherwise compelled by order of the court.!99
Prosecutors should not interfere in any manner with a defendant's abilities
to prepare and present a defense and to access witnesses. Some prosecutors
in the past have engaged in such conduct in several ways: (1) by deporting
illegal alien witnesses,00 (2) by obstructing the defense's attempts to locate
witnesses,2°' (3) by instructing witnesses not to talk to defense counsel, 02
(4) by instructing witnesses to report back to the prosecutor after a defense
197 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 26, § 3-3. 1(c) ("A prosecutor should
not discourage or obstruct communication between prospective witnesses and defense
counsel. A prosecutor should not advise any person or cause any person to be advised to
decline to give to the defense information which such person has the right to give.").
198 United States v. Williams, 205 F.3d 23, 29 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing United States v.
Golding, 168 F.3d 700, 705 (4th Cir. 1999); United States v. Vavages, 151 F.3d 1185, 1190-
92 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Heller, 830 F.2d 150, 153-54 (1 1th Cir. 1987)); see, e.g.,
Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972) (per curiam); cf United States v. Soape, 169 F.3d 257,
270 (5th Cir. 1999) ("Witnesses ... are the property of neither the prosecution nor the
defense [and] both sides have an equal right, and should have an equal opportunity, to
interview them.") (quoting Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1966));
see also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(B) (1980):
A public prosecutor or other government lawyer in criminal litigation shall make timely
disclosures to counsel for the defendant, or to the defendant if he has no counsel, of the existence
of evidence, known to the prosecutor or other government lawyer, that tends to negate the guilt
of the accused, mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the punishment.
199 Workman v. Bell, 178 F.3d 759, 772 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Matlock,
491 F.2d 504, 506 (6th Cir. 1974)).
200 See, e.g., United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982); United States v.
Villanueva, 408 F.3d 193, 200 (5th Cir. 2005).
201 See, e.g., United States v. Weddell, 800 F.2d 1404 (5th Cir. 1986) (cited in
GERSHMAN, supra note 63, § 10:63).
202 See, e.g., United States v. Carrigan, 804 F.2d 599 (10th Cir. 1986).
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interview, and (5) by demanding that the defense interview of a witness be
conducted in the prosecutor's presence.20 3
B. TIMING OF INDICTMENTS
The statute of limitations is the primary safeguard against
unreasonable prosecutorial delay in bringing a criminal allegation to
court. 20 4  Even though prosecutors have no obligation to file criminal
charges as soon as probable cause is shown to exist,20 5 a defendant may
challenge the prosecutor's delay in bringing an indictment under the Fifth
Amendment's due process clause 206 even when these charges are filed
before the running of the applicable statute of limitations.
The seminal Supreme Court cases regarding when a pre-indictment
delay deprives a defendant of due process discussed in The 1980 Article
207
were United States v. Marion20 8 and United States v. Lovasco.20 9  Since
203 See, e.g., United States v. Leung, 351 F. Supp. 2d 992 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
204 United States v. Henderson, 337 F.3d 914, 919 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v.
McMutuary, 217 F.3d 447, 481 (7th Cir. 2000)); see, e.g., Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S.
647, 665 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307,
332 (1971) ("[T]he applicable statute of limitations ... is ... the primary guarantee against
bringing overly stale criminal charges.") (second alteration in original)).
205 United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977).
206 The Sixth Amendment's speedy trial guarantee "[applies] to the interval between
accusation and trial, and does not obligate the United States to make speedy accusations,"
United States v. Vinson, 414 F.3d 924, 929 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Marion,
404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971)), and therefore is not implicated in the pre-indictment period. The
Speedy Trial Act and Rule 48(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure may be
implicated in this area when the arrest occurs before the prosecutor's decision to proceed
before the grand jury. The Speedy Trial Act requires that "any information or indictment
charging an individual with the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days
from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection
with such charges." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b).
Rule 48(b) states that "[t]he court may dismiss an indictment, information, or
complaint if unnecessary delay occurs in: (1) presenting a charge to a grand jury; (2) filing
an information against a defendant; or (3) bringing a defendant to trial." FED. R. CRIM. P.
48(b). "Rule 48(b) comes into play only after a defendant has been placed under arrest."
United States v. Barken, 412 F.3d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Mays,
549 F.2d 670, 674 n.4 (9th Cir. 1977)); see, e.g., United States v. Kalady, 941 F.2d 1090,
1094 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 n.8 (1977); United
States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 319 (1971); United States v. Revada, 574 F.2d 1047, 1048
(10th Cir. 1978)); United States v. Rein, 848 F.2d 777, 781 n.2 (7th Cir. 1988). See
generally U.S. ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 22, tit. 9, § 17.000 (providing guidance on
the Speedy Trial Act).
207 The 1980 Article, supra note 4, at 26-27.
208 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
209 431 U.S. 783 (1977).
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then, the Supreme Court has handed down two additional opinions on the
subject: United States v. Gouveia,21 ° and Arizona v. Youngblood.2 1 1 Under
the holdings of these cases, the standard the courts of appeal, with the
exception of the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, have applied to determine if the
preindictiment delay has deprived a defendant of due process is (1) whether
"the defendant may establish a due process violation if the prosecutorial
delay caused actual and substantial prejudice to the defendant's right to a
fair trial, ' ' 212 and (2) whether the "delay was a course intentionally pursued
by the government for an improper purpose., 213  There is no per se rule
establishing the passage of a particular period of time as being
presumptively unreasonable. Instead, "[t]o prove actual prejudice, the
defendant must identify witnesses or document lost during the period of
delay, and not merely make speculative or conclusory claims of possible
prejudice caused by the passage of time.
2 14
210 467 U.S. 180, 192 (1984).
211 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988).
212 United States v. Henderson, 337 F.3d 914, 920 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v.
McMutuary, 217 F.3d 447, 481-82 (7th Cir. 2000)); see, e.g., United States v. Perez-Perez,
337 F.3d 990, 996 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Brockman, 183 F.3d 891, 896-97
(8th Cir. 1999)).
213 United States v. Cornielle, 171 F.3d 748, 752 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing United States v.
Scarpa, 913 F.2d 993, 1014 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Hoo, 825 F.2d 667, 671 (2d Cir.
1987)); see, e.g., United States v. Sprouts, 282 F.2d 1037, 1041 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing
United States v. Sturdy, 207 F.3d 448, 451-52 (8th Cir. 2000)); United States v. Mulderig,
120 F.3d 534, 540 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497 (5th Cir.
1996) (en banc)). See Jones v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 905 (4th Cir. 1996) (collecting cases
from every circuit except for the Fourth and Ninth Circuit applying the second requirement
of intentional governmental delay).
The second prong of the Fourth Circuit's analysis is, after the defendant's showing of
prejudice, to
balance the defendant's prejudice against the government's justification for delay. "'The basic
inquiry then becomes whether the government's action in prosecuting after substantial delay
violates 'fundamental concepts ofjustice' or 'the community's sense of fair play and decency."'
Jones v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 904 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d
889, 895 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Automated Med. Labs., 770 F.2d 399, 404 (4th
Cir. 1985)). The Jones court recognized that the Fourth Circuit's second prong splits from
the other circuits and appears to be questionable in light of Supreme Court opinions, but
refused to overturn its prior case law since the panel was not sitting en banc. Id. at 905. The
Ninth Circuit follows a standard similar to the Fourth Circuit's balancing test. See United
States v. Ross, 123 F.3d 1181, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Moran, 759
F.2d 777, 782 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Swacker, 628 F.2d 1250, 1254 n.5 (9th Cir.
1980)).
214 United States v. Sprouts, 282 F.3d 1037, 1041 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v.
Sturdy, 207 F.3d 448, 451-52 (8th Cir. 2000)); see, e.g., Aleman v. Honorable Judges of
Circuit Court of Cook County, 138 F.3d 302, 310 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v.
Canoy, 38 F.3d 893, 902 (7th Cir. 1994)); United States v. Carlock, 806 F.2d 535, 549 (5th
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C. BARGAINING FOR TESTIMONY UNDER IMMUNITY
Through the use of immunity, a prosecutor can effectively eliminate a
witness's right to invoke his or her Fifth Amendment privilege when
refusing to testify. Using the powers to subpoena a witness, 21 5 to obtain a
grant of immunity for the witness, and to seek contempt when a witness
continues to refuse to testify, the prosecutor is able to fashion a situation in
which the witness must either testify or go to prison. 21 6 Immunity is only
available to a witness who has invoked the privilege against self-
incrimination or has proffered to do so because a grant of immunity
removes the privilege.217 Immunity may be either (1) use or transactional
immunity, 218 or (2) formal or informal immunity.
2 19
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005, a federal prosecutor, with the
advice and consent of the Department of Justice,220 can grant immunity to a
Cir. 1986) ("The passage of a long period of time between knowledge by the prosecution of
indictable conduct and an indictment is not enough, even if the delay was harmful to the
defendant." (citing United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 (1977))).
215 The power of the subpoena is a powerful tool for the prosecutor since there are few
acceptable reasons under the law for not complying with a subpoena. Cf In re Grand Jury
Proceedings of Special April 2002 Grand Jury, 347 F.3d 197, 208 (7th Cir. 2003) ("(F]ear
for one's own safety and the safety of one's family is not itself 'just cause' for refusing to
testify, and thus will not provide a defense to civil contempt in a grand jury proceeding.")
(citing Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 559 n.2 (1961)).
216 It is well established that the government may compel witnesses to testify at trial or before a
grand jury, on pain of contempt, so long as the witness is not the target of the criminal case in
which he testifies .... Even for persons who have a legitimate fear that their statements may
subject them to criminal prosecution, [the Supreme Court has] long permitted the compulsion of
incriminating testimony so long as those statements (or evidence derived from those statements)
cannot be used against the speaker in any criminal case.)
Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 767-68 (2003) (citations omitted); U.S. ATTORNEYS'
MANUAL, supra note 22, tit. 9, § 727 ("Should the witness refuse to testify pursuant to the
immunity order, he or she can be held in civil contempt under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. [§1
1826 and confined for the life of the court proceeding or the term of the grand jury, including
extensions."); see In re Grand Jury Proceedings of the Special April 2002 Grand Jury, 347
F.3d at 206-07.
217 Taylor v. Singletary, 148 F.3d 1276, 1283 n.7 (1 th Cir. 1998) (citing Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441, 461 (1972)).
218 Transactional immunity "protects the witness from prosecution for the offense or
offenses involved," while use immunity "only protects the witness against the government's
use of his or her immunized testimony in a prosecution of the witness-except in a
subsequent prosecution for perjury or giving a false statement." U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL,
supra note 22, tit. 9, § 717.
219 Formal immunity is immunity procured under statute. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05
(2000). Informal immunity is immunity that is given by the prosecutor's promise not to
prosecute the witness for any crimes that he or she may admit to when testifying. U.S.
ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 22, tit. 9, § 719.
220 See U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 22, tit. 9, §§ 720-7 1.
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witness by applying to the appropriate district court. The United States
Attorney is statutorily authorized to request an order from the district court
providing immunity to a witness who has refused to testify on the basis of
self-incrimination.2 21 Only federal prosecutors have authority under § 6003
to request a court to enter an immunity order; the district court does not
have inherent authority to grant immunity.
222
The law, as it existed in 1980, remains that federal prosecutors can
also provide "informal immunity" to a potential witness by assuring the
witness that he will not be prosecuted based on the testimony that the
221 18 U.S.C. § 6003. The United States Attorney's request must be pre-approved by the
appropriate Department of Justice official. Id. § 6003(b). The statute instructs the United
States Attorney to seek the grant of immunity when "in [the United States Attorney's]
judgment--(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may be necessary to
the public interest; and (2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or
provide other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination." Id.
The United States Attorneys' Manual states that:
[slome of the [non-inclusive] factors that should be weighed in making [the judgment that
testimony or information to be obtained from the witness may be necessary to the public interest]
include
A. The importance of the investigation or prosecution to effective enforcement of the criminal
laws;
B. The value of the person's testimony or information to the investigation or prosecution;
C. The likelihood of prompt and full compliance with a compulsion order, and the effectiveness
of available sanctions if there is no such compliance;
D. The person's relative culpability in connection with the offense or offenses being
investigated or prosecuted, and his or her criminal history;
E. The possibility of successfully prosecuting the person prior to compelling his or her
testimony;
F. The likelihood of adverse collateral consequences to the person if he or she testifies under a
compulsion order.
U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 22, tit. 9, § 23.210.
222 United States v. Serrano, 406 F.3d 1208, 1218 (10th Cir. 2005); see, e.g., United
States v. Burke, 425 F.3d 400, 411 (7th Cir. 2005) ("The United States Attorney has
authority to grant immunity to a witness; federal courts, by contrast, play only a ministerial
role in ensuring that this power is properly exercised." (citing United States v. George, 363
F.3d 666, 671-72 (7th Cir. 2004))); United States v. Washington, 398 F.3d 306, 310 (4th Cir.
2005) ("[A] district court is without authority to confer immunity on a witness sua sponte...
. [O]nly the prosecution is entitled to seek witness immunity in a federal criminal case."); cf
United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 467 (4th Cir. 2004) ("The circuits are divided
with respect to the question of whether a district court can ever compel the government, on
pain of dismissal, to grant immunity to a potential defense witness."). The Moussaoui court
also noted that the practice of a court compelling the prosecution to provide immunity to a
defense witness implicates separation of powers doctrine. Id.
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witness provides. 223  Informal immunity, which is also referred to as
"pocket immunity" or "letter immunity," is "conferred by agreement with
the witness" and therefore "[t]estimony given under informal immunity is
not compelled testimony, but is testimony pursuant to an agreement and
thus voluntary., 224 Informal immunity agreements are viewed as contracts
and are interpreted by the courts under the principles of contract law.
225
The parties traditionally negotiate for immunity through a proffer of
the proposed testimony. The proffer process is needed by the prosecutor in
order to evaluate the usefulness and believability of the proffered testimony.
The prosecutor must be careful as to scope of the information obtained
since that may limit future prosecutions against the individual offering the
proffer or eventual testimony under Kastigar. 226 The prosecutor must also
be careful to consider the veracity of the potential witness to ensure that the
prosecutor is not allowing the presentation of perjured testimony to the
grand jury.
D. THE PROSECUTOR'S DECISION TO SEEK AN INDICTMENT
As was the law in 1980, prosecutors have significant discretion in
deciding whether or not to bring a criminal charge.2 27 Judicial dismissal of
223 See, e.g., United States v. Quam, 367 F.3d 1006, 1008 n.2 (8th Cir. 2004).
224 U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 22, tit. 9, § 719. See, e.g., United States v.
McFarlane, 309 F.3d 510, 513 (8th Cir. 2002) ("Prosecutors often enter into informal
immunity agreements with criminal defendants, promising immunity in exchange for
information from the defendant about other criminal activity, which information may also
incriminate the defendant in the wrongdoing."); United States v. Hembree, 754 F.2d 314,
317 (10th Cir. 1985) (citing United States v. Feinberg, 631 F.2d 388, 390 (5th Cir. 1980)).
225 See United States v. McFarlane, 309 F.3d 510, 514 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing collection
of cases); United States v. Aleman, 286 F.3d 86, 89 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Andreas,
216 F.3d 645, 663 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Cantu, 185 F.3d 298, 302 (5th Cir.
1999); Taylor v. Singletary, 148 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 1998) ("In determining the
extent of immunity afforded a defendant under an [informal] immunity agreement, a court
should apply basic principles of contract law." (quoting United States v. Thompson, 25 F.3d
1558, 1561 (11th Cir. 1994))); United States v. Chiu, 109 F.3d 624, 625 (9th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Kilroy, 27 F.3d 679, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v. Hogan, 862 F.2d
386, 388 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing United States v. Crisp, 817 F.2d 256, 258 (4th Cir. 1987));
United States v. Curry, Nos. 3:05 CR 10 Jordan; 3:05 CR 10 Guyton, 2005 WL 2100651, at
*3 (E.D. Tenn. July 14, 2005).
226 See United States v. Daniels, 281 F.3d 168, 180 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) ("If a defendant shows that he has made immunized
statements regarding matters related to the federal prosecution, the Government must
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the evidence relied upon by the grand jury
was derived from independent, legitimate sources.").
227 See supra Part 11.
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a charge is an available remedy for a prosecutor's "selective prosecution',
228
and "vindictive prosecution., 229 The Supreme Court has not issued a direct
holding addressing whether outrageous government conduct can be
remedied through judicial dismissal of a subsequent indictment, 230 however,
228 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463 (1996) ("A selective-prosecution
claim is not a defense on the merits to the criminal charge itself, but an independent assertion
that the prosecutor has brought the charge for reasons forbidden by the Constitution.").
To make out a prima facie case of selective prosecution, a defendant must show that the
government singled him out for prosecution while it did not prosecute similarly situated others,
and that it decided to proceed against him based on impermissible grounds of discrimination or
because he exercised a constitutionally protected right.
MICAEL MONICO & BARRY SPEVACK, FEDERAL CRIMINAL PRACTICE: A SEVENTH CIRCUIT
HANDBOOK 234 (2005 ed.) (citing United States v. Alanis, 265 F.3d 576, 585 (7th Cir.
2001); Jarrett v. United States, 822 F.2d 1438, 1443 (7th Cir. 1987)). See generally
GERSHMAN, supra note 63, §§ 4:9-4.32.
229 See United States v. Falcon, 347 F.3d 1000, 1004 (7th Cir. 2003) ("A vindictive
prosecution claim arises when the government pursues prosecution in retaliation for the
exercise of a protected statutory or constitutional right.") (citations omitted); United States v.
Lampley, 127 F.3d 1231, 1245 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S.
368, 372 (1982); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) ("When a defendant
exercises constitutional or statutory rights in the course of criminal proceedings, the
government may not punish him for such exercise without violating due process guaranteed
by the federal Constitution.")); cf United States v. Raymer, 941 F.2d 1031, 1040 (10th Cir.
1991):
"[flf a defendant successfully challenges a conviction, a more severe sentence may not be
imposed after retrial in the absence of articulated reasons based upon objective information....
Likewise, a prosecutor may not "up the ante"' by filing felony charges when a convicted
misdemeanant exercises his statutory appellate right to trial de novo.
Id.;
The provision, [providing a two level enhancement for obstructing or impeding the
administration of justice], is not intended to punish a defendant for the exercise of a
constitutional right. A defendant's denial of guilt (other than a denial of guilt under oath that
constitutes perjury), refusal to admit guilt or provide information to a probation officer, or refusal
to enter a plea of guilty is not a basis for application of this provision.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 cmt. n.2 (2005). See generally GERSHMAN,
supra note 63, §§ 4:33-67.
"The Supreme Court has made clear that the law governing plea negotiations is
different from the law of vindictive prosecutions." United States v. Schneider, 395 F.3d 78,
88 n.5 (2d Cir. 2005). The reason for the difference is that plea negotiations have been
recognized by the Supreme Court as a valid process in which the prosecutor may decide to
forgo the prosecution of legitimate charges in exchange for the time and expense savings
brought forth by the defendant's plea to lesser charges. See United States v. Goodwin, 457
U.S. 368, 380 (1982); see also U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 22, tit. 9, §§ 16.000,
27.330-27.7 10 (providing policy guidance on plea negotiations and agreements).
230 See United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 224 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Hampton
v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973));
United States v. Mosely, 965 F.2d 906, 908 (10th Cir. 1992) ("When the government's
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in cases before the lower federal courts, such dismissals are rare and the
circuits are currently split over the question of whether the defense exists at
all. 231
Federal prosecutors considering whether to bring a criminal charge can
look to the Department of Justice's "Principles of Federal Prosecution"
section of the Manual.2 32 The minimum requirement for initiating federal
prosecution is the requirement of probable cause. However, a prosecutor
may decide to continue an investigation or even decline prosecution even
when probable cause exists that a crime has been committed.23 3 The ABA's
Criminal Justice Section Prosecution Function Standards also provide
guidance for prosecutors' charging decisions.
234
conduct during an investigation is sufficiently outrageous, the courts will not allow the
government to prosecute offenses developed through that conduct.").
231 Compare United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 241 (7th Cir. 1995), United States v.
Tucker, 28 F.3d 1420, 1428 (6th Cir. 1994) (rejecting the doctrine completely), and United
States v. Capelton, 350 F.3d 231, 243 n.5 (1st Cir. 2003) ("[The outrageous government
conduct] doctrine is moribund; in practice, courts have rejected its application with almost
monotonous regularity.") (quoting United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1993)), with
United States v. Berkovich, 168 F.3d 64, 68-69 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Barbosa, 271
F.3d 438, 469 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Gutierrez, 343 F.3d 415, 421 (5th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Nguyen, 250 F.3d 643, 645-46 (8th Cir. 2001) (recognizing the existence of
the doctrine but noting that it is available in the rarest of circumstances).
232 U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 22, tit. 9, § 27.001 ("These principles were
originally promulgated by Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti on July 28, 1980. While
they have since been updated to reflect changes in the law and current policy of the
Department of Justice, the underlying message to Federal prosecutors remains unchanged.").
233 Id. tit. 9, § 27.200(B) cmt. The United States Attorneys' Manual also states that:
The attorney for the government should commence or recommend Federal prosecution if he/she
believes that the person's conduct constitutes a Federal offense and that the admissible evidence
will probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction, unless, in his/her judgment,
prosecution should be declined because: (1) no substantial Federal interest would be served by
prosecution; (2) the person is subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction; or (3) there
exists an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution.
Id. tit. 9, § 27.220.
234 Standard 3-3.9 Discretion in the Charging Decision:
(a) A prosecutor should not institute, or cause to be instituted, or permit the continued pendency
of criminal charges when the prosecutor knows that the charges are not supported by probable
cause. A prosecutor should not institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the continued pendency
of criminal charges in the absence of sufficient admissible evidence to support a conviction.
(b) The prosecutor is not obligated to present all charges which the evidence might support. The
prosecutor may in some circumstances and for good cause consistent with the public interest
decline to prosecute, notwithstanding that sufficient evidence may exist which would support a
conviction. Illustrative or the factors which the prosecutor may properly consider in exercising
his or her discretion are:
(i) the prosecutor's reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact guilty;
(ii) the extent of the harm caused by the offense;
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VII. ADDRESSING IMPROPER PREINDICTMENT PROSECUTORIAL CONDUCT
The 1980 Article did not contain a separate section discussing a means
for addressing improper preindictment prosecutorial conduct. Fortunately,
most federal prosecutors act in accordance with the Constitution, the
statutory law, the applicable federal rules of procedure and the Department
of Justice's policies. Consequently, the question of what is the appropriate
remedy for improper preindictment prosecutorial conduct has arisen
infrequently. Because several important developments have occurred in
this area of the law over the past twenty-five years, we have added this
section.
The 1980 Article cited several cases in which a federal court either
dismissed an indictment or recognized the authority of federal courts to
dismiss an indictment, because of prosecutorial misconduct in the pre-
indictment setting, including: (1) failure to follow ethical requirements set
forth in the Code of Federal Regulations; 235 (2) violating Rule 6(d)'s
prohibition on the presence of unauthorized individuals in the grand jury
room; 236 and (3) improprieties in the prosecutor's presentation to the grand
(iii) the disproportion of the authorized punishment in retaliation to the particular offense or
the offender;
(iv) possible improper motives of a complainant;
(v) reluctance of the victim to testify;
(vi) cooperation of the accused in the apprehension or conviction of others; and
(vii) availability and likelihood of prosecution by another jurisdiction.
(c) A prosecutor should not be compelled by his or her supervisor to prosecute a case in which
he or she has a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused.
(d) In making the decision to prosecute, the prosecutor should give no weight to the personal or
political advantages or disadvantages which might be involved or to a desire to enhance his or
her record of convictions.
(e) In cases which involve a serious threat to the community, the prosecutor should not be
deterred from prosecution by the fact that in the jurisdiction juries have tended to acquit persons
accused of the particular kind of criminal act in question.
(f) The prosecutor should not bring or seek charges greater in number or degree than can be
reasonably supported with evidence at trial or than are necessary to fairly reflect the gravity of
the offense.
(g) The prosecutor should not condition a dismissal of charges, nolle prosequi, or similar action
on the accused relinquishment of the right to seek civil redress unless the accused has agreed to
the action knowingly and intelligently, freely and voluntarily, and where such waiver is approved
by the court.
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 26, § 3-3.9 (1993).
235 The 1980 Article, supra note 4, at 3-4 (citing United States v. Gold, 470 F. Supp.
1336 (N.D. Ill. 1979)).
236 Id. at 13 n.99 (citing collection of cases).
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jury, including making inflammatory comments to the grand jury, failing to
disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, or willfully misleading the
grand jury.2 3 7 In the period leading up to the 1980 Article, federal courts
were increasingly sensitive to the prejudice that could result to a putative
defendant and the appropriateness of federal courts providing a remedy.2 38
Two Supreme Court decisions in the late 1980's, United States v.
Mechanik,239 and Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States,240 and one in 1992,
United States v. Williams,241 have refined the law. Federal courts now have
a more limited role in remedying pre-indictment prosecutorial misconduct
than in 1980. The lower federal courts have also applied the legal standards
enumerated by the Supreme Court in Mechanik, Bank of Nova Scotia, and
Williams beyond the factual situations present in those three cases to other
types of alleged pre-indictment prosecutorial misconduct.
242
In Bank of Nova Scotia, the Supreme Court held that a defendant
seeking to dismiss an indictment before trial must demonstrate that the
237 Id. at 16-17 nn. 129-33 (citing collection of cases).
238 See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 61-63 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing
United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 884 (9th Cir. 1979) (failing to inform the grand
jury of its authority to subpoena witnesses); United States v. Lawson, 502 F. Supp. 158, 162,
nn.6-7 (D. Md. 1980) (misstating facts); United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 786 (9th
Cir. 1974) (prosecutor's presentation of perjured testimony); United States v. Roberts, 481 F.
Supp. 1385, 1389, n.10 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (misstating the law); United States v. Gold, 470 F.
Supp. 1336, 1346-51 (N.D. 111. 1979) (operating under a conflict of interest); United States v.
Phillips Petroleum, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 610, 615-17 (N.D. Okla. 1977) (questioning a witness
outside of the grand jury's presence resulting in exculpatory testimony but failing to inform
grand of the exculpatory testimony)).
239 475 U.S. 66 (1986).
240 487 U.S. 250 (1988).
241 504 U.S. 36 (1992).
242 See United States v. Vincent, 416 F.3d 593, 602 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting United
States v. Fountain, 840 F.2d 509, 515 (7th Cir. 1988) (applying Mechanik's analysis beyond
its original factual situation of a violation of Rule 6(d) "to rules that are designed to prevent
the indictment of innocent persons"); United States v. Strouse, 268 F.3d 767 (5th Cir. 2002)
(applying Mechanik, Bank of Nova Scotia and Williams to a case of prosecutorial misconduct
involving the presentation of perjured testimony to the grand jury); United States v. Myers,
123 F.3d 350, 355-58 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Gillespie, 974 F.2d 796, 801 (7th Cir.
1992) ("The Supreme Court has delineated a very limited scope for [a federal court's]
supervisory powers; Williams, in particular, clearly circumscribes the application of that
power to cases involving the violation of the Constitution, applicable statutes, and the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure."); United States v. Ruedlinger, Nos. 97-40012-01-
RDR, 97-40012-02-RDR, 1997 WL 807911, at *2 (D. Kan. Dec. 3, 1997):
In accordance with Williams, the court shall not invoke our supervisory powers to suppress the
defendant's testimony for the violations noted by the defendant, even if they did occur, since the
prosecutor's alleged misconduct did not violate the Constitution, an applicable statute, or one of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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prosecutor's misconduct resulted in prejudice.243 Constitutional errors that
diminish the structural protections of the grand jury to the point of
rendering the proceeding "fundamentally unfair' 244 are presumed to be
prejudicial by definition. Dismissal for non-constitutional errors and
constitutional errors that do not affect the grand jury's structural protections
are only permissible if the error substantially influenced the grand jury's
decision to indict or if there is grave doubt that the grand jury's decision to
indict was free from these influences.24 5
The Supreme Court's decision in Mechanik addressed the evaluation
of pre-indictment misconduct raised by the defendant in the post-trial
setting. The Court in Mechanik held that a subsequent finding against the
defendant of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt rendered the preindictment
prosecutorial misconduct harmless. 246  The only recognized exception is
that a court can set aside a final judgment of conviction because of the
racial composition of the grand jury.24 7 Lastly, in United States v. Williams,
the Supreme Court held that a federal court does not have inherent authority
to fashion rules to remedy misconduct occurring before the grand jury
because, despite the grand jury's interaction with the federal court, the
grand jury once convened is a separate institution that the convening federal
court cannot supervise.2 48 The Williams Court did, however, preserve a
federal court's authority to remedy prosecutorial misconduct that occurred
before the grand jury in the pre-trial setting when the misconduct involved
"one of those 'few, clear rules which were carefully drafted and approved
by [the Supreme Court] and by Congress to ensure the integrity of the grand
jury's function.' 249
So far, the lower federal courts have interpreted the Supreme Court's
decisions to only recognize racial and gender violations in the selection of
the grand jurors as fundamental defects that alter the grand jury process so
243 Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 254.
244 Id. at 256-57.
245 Id. at 256 (citing United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 78 (1986) (O'Connor, J.
concurring)).
246 But the petit jury's subsequent guilty verdict means not only that there was probable cause to
believe that the defendants were guilty as charged, but also that they are in fact guilty as charged
beyond a reasonable doubt. Measured by the petit jury's verdict, then, any error in the grand jury
proceeding connected with the charging decision was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 70.
247 Id. at 70 n. 1.
248 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992).
249 Id. at 46 (quoting Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 74 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)).
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significantly that a court must presume prejudice. 250 Federal courts have
held that all other defects, including violations of Rule 6, do not
automatically require the dismissal of an indictment, but instead must be
evaluated to determine whether prejudice to an indicted defendant has
occurred.2 5
The right to be free from racial and gender discrimination is not unique
to the grand jury and is instead more appropriately assigned to the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process clause which contains the notion of equal
protection as applied in the federal system. The right to an independent
grand jury is in itself a constitutional right under the Fifth Amendment. Yet
if the courts hold that only racial and gender violations are sufficient to
allow immediate dismissal of an indictment, and this is coupled with
reliance on a subsequent petit jury determination to make grand jury errors
harmless, then the question becomes how egregious must the prosecutorial
misconduct be for a defendant to demonstrate the prejudice necessary for
the dismissal of an indictment?
252
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure suggest that a motion to
dismiss an indictment based on occurrences before the grand jury may be
successful in some situations. Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(ii) allows for the disclosure
of grand jury material to a defendant who demonstrates that grounds may
exist to dismiss an indictment because of a matter occurring before the
grand jury.253 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are promulgated by
the Supreme Court under rule-making authority delegated by Congress.254
The continuing existence of Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(ii) indicates that, despite the
requirement of showing prejudice, a dismissal of the indictment for
violations of Rule 6 remains a viable sanction under appropriate
circumstances.
250 United States v. Nelson-Rodriguez, 319 F.3d 12, 29 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v.
Exarhos, 135 F.3d 723, 726-27 (1 1th Cir. 1998) (quoting Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at
257); United States v. Mazzola, 183 F. Supp. 2d 195, 200-01 (D. Mass. 2001) (quoting Bank
of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 256-57).
251 See United States v. Wooten, 377 F.3d 1134, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying
Mechanik's harmless error rule to a Rule 6(d) violation); United States v. Vincent, 416 F.3d
593, 600 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 256; United States v.
Geisler, 143 F.3d 1070, 1072 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Brooks, 125 F.3d 484, 497
(7th Cir. 1997)); United States v. J.J.K., 76 F.3d 870, 872 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Rule 6(e) does
not create a right not to be tried.").
252 See LAFAVE, supra note 28, § 15.6 (discussing whether the federal courts might
consider regulating prosecutorial misconduct under the Fifth Amendment right to a grand
jury).
253 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(ii).
254 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (2000).
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Letting those who have allegedly violated federal criminal law go free
because of prosecutorial misconduct at the preindictment stage is a
distasteful scenario. Equally unappealing is allowing prosecutors, who
represent the public in the pursuant of justice, the freedom to act
unethically. In Bank of Nova Scotia, the Supreme Court tried to balance
these two concerns when it stated:
Errors of the kind alleged in these cases can be remedied adequately by means other
than dismissal. For example, a knowing violation of Rule 6 may be punished as a
contempt of court .... In addition, the court may direct a prosecutor to show cause
why he should not be disciplined and request the bar or the Department of Justice to
initiate disciplinary proceedings against him. The court may also chastise the
prosecutor in a published opinion. Such remedies allow the court to focus on the
culpable individual rather than granting a windfall to the unprejudiced defendant. 255
Thus, the remedy suggested by the Supreme Court is one that attempts
to focus solely on the prosecutor without providing a windfall to the
allegedly guilty individual with its associated harm to society. Congress'
efforts in passing the Hyde Amendment256 in 1997 and 28 U.S.C. § 530B in
1998 are two examples of attempts to address concerns over prosecutorial
misconduct without subjecting the public to the collateral harm of having to
let the guilty go free.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In light of the changes in the law over the past twenty-five plus years,
one can only begin to speculate as to what the next twenty-five years will
bring. What is clear is that the federal courts now have less inherent
authority to remedy alleged inappropriate prosecutorial conduct occurring at
the pre-indictment stage than in 1980. It is also clear that today's defendant
has a lesser chance of success on a motion to dismiss an indictment for
prosecutorial misconduct than a defendant bringing the same motion in
1980.
Prosecutors still must do what is fair because they are still first and
foremost required to do justice. The overwhelming number of hardworking
ethical federal prosecutors seek to do just that, which is, of course, more
than merely winning and losing or locking up the bad guy.257 As the
Supreme Court stated in United States v. Berger:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
255 Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 263.
256 See supra Part 1.
257 See generally Bruce A. Green, Prosecuting Means More Than Locking Up Bad Guys,
LITIG., Fall 2005, at 12.
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compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As
such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim
of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows,
he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate
means to bring about a just one.258
In light of the changes that have occurred, perhaps Congress may
decide to provide additional legislation beyond that which is on the books
today. Both the Manual259 and the regulations promulgated by the Attorney
General for implementing 28 U.S.C. § 530B2 60 hold that the respective
regulations do not create enforceable rights in parties harmed by
prosecutors who violate these regulations. Congress could act to
incorporate certain requirements in the Manual into either statutory law or
the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court could, in exercising
its rule-making authority and acting with the concurrence of Congress,
promulgate changes to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. On the
other hand, it may be appropriate to leave it to the Department of Justice to
provide internal regulation of its prosecutors as it currently does through the
Office of Professional Responsibility. It will take the efforts of all three
branches of government to develop the proper balance between the societal
needs for zealous prosecution of criminal conduct and the protection of the
rights of individual defendants.
Regardless of what changes do or do not occur in the future, the
central purpose of the federal criminal justice system is to bring forth a just
result in each case. The authors hope that this work will assist all persons
working within the federal criminal justice system in fulfilling that goal.
258 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
259 U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 22, tit. 9, § 1.100.
260 Judicial Administration, 28 C.F.R. § 77.5 (2005).
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